Experimental Jurisprudence
Kevin Tobia†
“Experimental jurisprudence” draws on empirical methods to inform questions typically associated with jurisprudence and legal theory. Scholars in this
flourishing movement conduct empirical studies about a variety of legal language
and concepts. Despite the movement’s growth, its justification is still opaque. Jurisprudence is the study of deep and longstanding theoretical questions about law’s
nature, but “experimental jurisprudence,” it might seem, simply surveys laypeople.
This Article elaborates on and defends experimental jurisprudence. Experimental
jurisprudence, appropriately understood, is not only consistent with traditional
jurisprudence; it is an essential branch of it.
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I. WHAT IS EXPERIMENTAL JURISPRUDENCE?
Experimental jurisprudence is scholarship that addresses
jurisprudential questions with empirical data, typically data
from experiments.1 This two-part definition is straightforward.2
But it leads to surprising implications for the nature of jurisprudence and the research that it calls for.3
This Article introduces experimental jurisprudence (also
known as “XJur”) and proposes a framework to understand its
contributions.4 Next, it debunks several common myths about
the movement.5 Finally, it explains the central role that XJur
should play in two other modern jurisprudential movements: the
rise of “ordinary meaning” in legal interpretation and the “New
Private Law.”6 To unpack the two-part definition—

1

The term “experimental jurisprudence” nods to “experimental philosophy,” the
related experimental approach to questions in philosophy. See Joshua Knobe & Shaun
Nichols, An Experimental Philosophy Manifesto, in EXPERIMENTAL PHILOSOPHY 3, 3
(Joshua Knobe & Shaun Nichols eds., 2008); see also Stephen Stich & Kevin P. Tobia,
Experimental Philosophy and the Philosophical Tradition, in A COMPANION TO EXPERIMENTAL PHILOSOPHY 5, 5 (Justin Sytsma & Wesley Buckwalter eds., 2016) (explaining
different versions and goals of experimental philosophy). One of the first modern mention of “experimental jurisprudence” is in Lawrence B. Solum, The Positive Foundations
of Formalism: False Necessity and American Legal Realism, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2464,
2465 n.5 (2014) (first citing JOHN MIKHAIL, ELEMENTS OF MORAL COGNITION (2011); and
then citing Kenworthey Bilz, Dirty Hands or Deterrence? An Experimental Examination
of the Exclusionary Rule, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 149 (2012)). Although new, the
movement builds on important theoretical work in naturalizing jurisprudence, see generally, e.g., BRIAN LEITER, NATURALIZING JURISPRUDENCE (2007), and the role of social science in legal philosophy, see generally, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Social Science and the
Philosophy of Law, in CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 95 (John Tasioulas ed., 2020). The term “experimental jurisprudence” had been used fifty years ago,
in a very different way. See Frederick K. Beutel, The Relationship of Experimental Jurisprudence to Other Schools of Jurisprudence and to Scientific Method, 1971 WASH. U.
L.Q. 385, 409 (1971) (describing an experimental-jurisprudence approach that required
“[s]ocial [e]ngineering in [g]overnment”).
2
It is mostly straightforward. See infra Part III.E on why “experimental jurisprudence” is better understood as “empirical jurisprudence.”
3
See infra Part III.
4
See infra Parts I, II.
5
See infra Part III.
6
See infra Parts IV.A, IV.B. On ordinary meaning, see generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Meaning of Legal “Meaning” and Its Implications for Theories of Legal Interpretation, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1235 (2015). On the New Private Law, see generally THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE NEW PRIVATE LAW (Andrew S. Gold et al. eds., 2020).
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“experiments” plus “jurisprudence”—it is helpful to reflect on the
meaning of each term. This first Part begins with that background.
The meaning of “jurisprudence” is itself highly controversial.7 Consider some representative descriptions:
• In the United States, jurisprudence is “mostly synonymous with ‘philosophy of law’ [but there is also] a lingering sense of ‘jurisprudence’ that encompasses high
legal theory . . . the elucidation of legal concepts and
normative theory from within the discipline of law.”8
• Jurisprudence is “the most fundamental, general,
and theoretical plane of analysis of the social phenomenon called law. . . . Problems of jurisprudence
include whether and in what sense law is objective
. . . the meaning of legal justice . . . and the problematics of interpreting legal texts.”9
• The “essence of the subject . . . involves the analysis
of general legal concepts.”10
These representative descriptions each characterize jurisprudence broadly—and differently. As such, this Article understands jurisprudence inclusively. In the words of legal philosopher Julie Dickson, jurisprudence is a “broad church.”11 It is
concerned with descriptive questions about legal concepts and
interpretation as well as normative questions about what law
should be.12 Jurisprudence approaches these questions from a
broadly theoretical perspective, but it is not committed to a particular methodology.13
Despite this inclusivity and breadth, if forced to identify the
core of modern jurisprudence, some might point to analytical
7
See generally R.H.S. Tur, What Is Jurisprudence?, 28 PHIL. Q. 149 (1978). See
also Schauer, supra note 1, at 95 n.2:
The word ‘jurisprudence’ is often used these days as a synonym for ‘philosophy
of law’. But given the longstanding existence of fields known as historical jurisprudence, sociological jurisprudence, and so on . . . the word . . . remains
ambiguous. Nevertheless, it remains important to resist the notion that . . .
[jurisprudence] must necessarily be philosophical in method or focus.
8
Lawrence Solum, Legal Theory Lexicon 044: Legal Theory, Jurisprudence, and the
Philosophy of Law, LEGAL THEORY LEXICON (May 6, 2018), https://perma.cc/ERE3-CMHW.
9
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE, at xi (1990).
10 Tur, supra note 7, at 152.
11 Julie Dickson, Ours Is a Broad Church: Indirectly Evaluative Legal Philosophy
as a Facet of Jurisprudential Inquiry, 6 JURISPRUDENCE 207, 209 (2015); see also Dan
Priel, Evidence-Based Jurisprudence: An Essay for Oxford, in 2 ANALISI E DIRITTO 87, 88
(Giovanni Battista et al. eds., 2019).
12 See generally ROBIN WEST, NORMATIVE JURISPRUDENCE: AN INTRODUCTION (2011).
13 Dickson, supra note 11, at 209; Schauer, supra note 1, at 95–96.
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jurisprudence.14 A central project of analytical jurisprudence is
the examination of legal concepts, including the law itself,15 causation,16 reasonableness,17 punishment,18 and property.19 That
research typically involves “conceptual analysis,” in which jurisprudence scholars reflect on legal concepts and attempt to articulate their features. Conceptual analysis also raises questions
about which features concepts should have.20 Despite some skepticism about conceptual analysis, it remains central to jurisprudence. As Alex Langlinais and Professor Brian Leiter put it, “In
many areas of philosophy, doubts about . . . conceptual and linguistic analysis . . . have become common . . . but not so in legal
philosophy.”21
Good scholarship has good methods. What are the methods
of jurisprudence? Within conceptual analysis, a common method
involves reflecting on hypothetical test cases, i.e., thought experiments.22 One’s intuitions about these test cases are taken to provide evidence about whether the proposed analysis is successful.23
As an example, consider the legal concept of reasonableness.
This concept is central to legal determinations such as tort negligence,24 open contract price terms,25 and the line between murder and manslaughter.26 The term “reasonable” appears in over
one-third of modern published judicial decisions.27 So what are
14

Tur, supra note 7, at 152.
H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 1 (2d ed. 1994).
16 See generally H.L.A. HART & TONY HONORÉ, CAUSATION IN THE LAW (2d ed. 1985).
17 See generally John Gardner, The Many Faces of the Reasonable Person, 131 L.Q.
REV. 563 (2015).
18 See GEORGE P. FLETCHER, BASIC CONCEPTS OF CRIMINAL LAW, at viii (1998).
19 See JOHN AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE OR THE PHILOSOPHY OF POSITIVE LAW 795–99 (London, J. Murray ed., 1869). See generally Felix S. Cohen, Dialogue
on Private Property, 9 RUTGERS L. REV. 357 (1954).
20 See, e.g., Brian Bix, Conceptual Questions and Jurisprudence, 1 LEGAL THEORY
465 (1995); see also Aaron J. Rappaport, On the Conceptual Confusions of Jurisprudence,
7 WASH. U. JURIS. REV. 77, 79 (2014).
21 Alex Langlinais & Brian Leiter, The Methodology of Legal Philosophy, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF PHILOSOPHICAL METHODOLOGY 671, 677 (Herman Cappelen et al.
eds., 2016).
22 See id.
23 Brian Leiter, Beyond the Hart/Dworkin Debate: The Methodology Problem in
Jurisprudence, 48 AM. J. JURIS. 17, 43–44 (2003) (explaining that jurisprudence “relies
on two central argumentative devices—analyses of concepts and appeals to intuition”).
24 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM
§ 3 (AM. L. INST. 2005).
25 U.C.C. § 2-305 (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 2020).
26 MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(1)(b) (AM. L. INST. 1980).
27 Historical
Trends,
CASELAW
ACCESS
PROJECT,
https://case.law/trends/?q=reasonable.
15
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the legal criteria of what is reasonable? Jurisprudential analysis
might begin with a proposed criterion before reflecting on test
cases to intuitively assess the success of the proposed criterion.28
As a simple example, consider this criterion: an act is reasonable if—and only if—it is welfare maximizing in expectation.
So, in negligence law, the proposed analysis holds that reasonable care is the care that would be expected to lead to the welfaremaximizing result. How might a legal philosopher evaluate the
strength of this proposed analysis? They might assess this jurisprudential analysis against the following thought experiment
about “life-saving negligence”:
A company produces and sells yachts, donating all profits to
a high-impact charity. That donation saves five lives per sale.
Yacht production also creates pollution, which foreseeably kills
one person in the nearby town per sale. The company could
cheaply install a new production mechanism that would eliminate all pollution and increase production costs. That would
eliminate all pollution deaths in the nearby town and decrease
profits and thus donations, reducing lives saved to only two per
yacht produced. The company does not install the new mechanism, and a number of people die from the pollution, and more
are saved by the donations.
This decision appears to be welfare maximizing (five lives
saved for each lost—plus the benefits of yachts). But it might
seem, intuitively, that the company has not acted with “reasonable care” by failing to install the pollution-eliminating production mechanism.29
Such a reaction to this thought experiment represents
something like a legal-philosophical discovery. The legal philosopher now has some intuitive “data,” which might imply that the
proposed conceptual analysis needs revision. That intuition (if
widely shared) suggests that reasonable care is not simply

28 E.g., George P. Fletcher, The Right and the Reasonable, 98 HARV. L. REV. 949,
949–50 (1985); see also Gregory C. Keating, Reasonableness and Rationality in Negligence Theory, 48 STAN. L. REV. 311, 311 (1996).
29 Or maybe not. Perhaps some readers do not share the intuition. The aim here is
not to analyze reasonableness but to demonstrate a very familiar method of analysis.
Ignoring unshared intuitions can lead to some problems. There is a danger that the
process of conceptual analysis falls victim to groupthink and to information cascades if
those “who do not share the intuition are simply not invited to the games.” Robert Cummins, Reflection on Reflective Equilibrium, in RETHINKING INTUITION 113, 116 (Michael
R. DePaul & William Ramsey eds., 1998). The “shared” intuition takes on increasing
strength as those with minority views leave the debate.
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welfare-maximizing care, and we should refine the analysis, test
that revision with more cases, refine the analysis in light of
those, and so on.
The life-saving-negligence thought experiment may elicit a
shared response (for instance, that the company did not act with
reasonable care). This response is an intuition. A jurist describes
some scenario (actual or hypothetical) and invites readers to
consider some questions about the scenario: Does the care seem
reasonable? Which action seems like the cause? Is that rule a legal rule? Thought experiments and corresponding intuitions in
legal theory include Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’s Bad Man,30
the criminality of Professor Lon Fuller’s Speluncean Explorers,31
excuses for Professor Sandy Kadish’s Mr. Fact and Mr. Law,32
and the meaning of rules like Professor Frederick Schauer’s “no
vehicles in the park”33 or Fuller’s “[i]t shall be a misdemeanor
. . . to sleep in any railway station.”34
Most legal philosophers value this kind of intuitive evidence. Many give intuition great significance. As the philosopher
and legal theorist Thomas Nagel puts it: “Given a knockdown
argument for an intuitively unacceptable conclusion, one should
assume there is probably something wrong with the argument
that one cannot detect—though it is also possible that the source
of the intuition has been misidentified.”35
Of course, legal theorists rarely take shared intuitions to
settle jurisprudential debate. For one, different cases can give
rise to conflicting intuitions. Jurisprudence takes care to understand and resolve those conflicts. In her seminal work on the
concept of consent, Professor Heidi Hurd proposes: “What should
we do in the face of our conflicting intuitions . . . ? One possible
solution is to grapple with our intuitions some more in the hope
that further thought experiments will help us to determine
which set of intuitions misleads us.”36 Nagel offers another solution: assess whether the “source of the intuition has been misi-

30

Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459 (1897).
See generally Lon L. Fuller, The Case of the Speluncean Explorers, 62 HARV. L.
REV. 616 (1949).
32 MONRAD PAULSEN & SANFORD KADISH, CRIMINAL LAW 485–86 (1962).
33 See Frederick Schauer, A Critical Guide to Vehicles in the Park, 83 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1109, 1110–11 (2008).
34 Lon Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law: A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV.
L. REV. 630, 664 (1958).
35 THOMAS NAGEL, MORTAL QUESTIONS, at x (1979).
36 Heidi M. Hurd, The Moral Magic of Consent, 2 LEGAL THEORY 121, 143 (1996).
31
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dentified.”37 These methodological proposals—to assess whether
intuitions are shared among philosopher colleagues or other
persons, to grapple with further thought experiments, to uncover the “sources” of one’s intuitions—are all part of traditional jurisprudence.
Experimental jurisprudence can be seen as providing an
empirically grounded method of thought experimentation. As an
example, consider the following experimental study about intent.38 The study, conducted by Professors Markus Kneer and
Sacha Bourgeois-Gironde, investigates a jurisprudential question: Does whether a side effect seems to be produced intentionally depend on the severity of the side effect?39 Traditional jurisprudence might assess that question with thought
experimentation, considering two examples of similar actions
that lead to differently severe side effects.
Experimental jurisprudence proceeds in a similar way. In
this case, the researchers recruited participants and randomly
assigned them to evaluate two different scenarios.40 In the first
scenario (the “moderate” one), a mayor decides to build a new
highway in order to improve the flow of traffic. However, the
highway construction has a foreseeable side effect.41 It will produce a moderate environmental impact; specifically, it will disturb some animals in the construction zone.42 The mayor states
that he does not “care at all about the environment” and proceeds with the program.43 In the second scenario (“severe”), another group of participants evaluates a very similar case, except
that, in this version, the environmental side effect is severe. It is
foreseeable that the impacted animals will die.44 Again, the
mayor makes the same statement and goes ahead with the plan.
In both scenarios, participants evaluate the same question: Did
the mayor “intentionally” harm the environment?45

37

NAGEL, supra note 35, at x.
See generally Markus Kneer & Sacha Bourgeois-Gironde, Mens Rea Ascription,
Expertise and Outcome Effects: Professional Judges Surveyed, 169 COGNITION 139 (2017);
Joshua Knobe, Intentional Action and Side Effects in Ordinary Language, 63 ANALYSIS
190 (2003); infra Part II.
39 Kneer & Bourgeois-Gironde, supra note 38, at 143–44.
40 Id. at 143.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 Kneer & Bourgeois-Gironde, supra note 38, at 143.
45 Id.
38
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This study found that, perhaps surprisingly, intuitions
about intentionality are sensitive to outcome severity.46 Even
though the mayor expresses the same attitude in both scenarios,
participants assess his mental state differently.47 They more
strongly agreed that the harm was produced “intentionally” in
the severe case.48
This result informs conceptual analysis.49 For example, we
can consider two different accounts of intentional action: one in
which intentionality is, in fact, sensitive to outcome severity and
one in which it is not. As in a traditional jurisprudential analysis, this conceptual analysis makes predictions about how the
concept applies. Experimental jurisprudence tests those predictions, supplementing thought experimentation with cognitivescientific experimentation. Of course, one study does not resolve
all debate. In response to this empirical finding, some might argue that the ordinary concept of intentionality is severity sensitive, and future empirical research could seek to test additional
predictions of that theory. Others might argue that the experimental participants here exhibit some kind of bias. That latter
account might be supported by further empirical research that
clarifies that the “source” of the participants’ intuitions is in
some way inappropriate or untrustworthy.50
As this example suggests, there are complementarities between traditional and experimental jurisprudence. Traditional
jurisprudence often proposes shared intuitions—i.e., claims
46

Id.
Id.
48 Id.
49 Or perhaps this method might exceed traditional analyses. For example, Professor Felipe Jiménez has written a generous and insightful critique of experimental jurisprudence, arguing that in legal theory, conceptual analysis should look primarily to the
judgments of “legal officials.” Felipe Jiménez, Some Doubts About Folk Jurisprudence:
The Case of Proximate Cause, U. CHI. L. REV. ONLINE (Aug. 23, 2021),
https://perma.cc/QP5H-YRXC. Jiménez’s critique is leveled primarily at “folk jurisprudence.” Rather than relying on laypeople’s judgments, Jiménez argues that conceptual
analysis should rely on the judgments of legal officials. But that proposal has a (perhaps)
surprising implication: insofar as most legal philosophers are not legal officials, jurisprudence should not generally rely on the judgments of legal-philosophy PhDs. So even
some critics of folk jurisprudence may find that experimental jurisprudence has something to offer. For example, in the experimental-jurisprudence study discussed here, the participants were professional judges. See Kneer & Bourgeois-Gironde, supra note 38, at 143.
50 In experimental philosophy, the “negative” program has focused on these types of
debunking arguments. See, e.g., Joshua Alexander, Ronald Mallon & Jonathan M. Weinberg, Accentuate the Negative, 1 REV. PHIL. PSYCH. 297, 298 n.2 (2010). See generally Stephen Stich & Kevin Tobia, Experimental Philosophy and the Philosophical Tradition, in
A COMPANION TO EXPERIMENTAL PHILOSOPHY 5 (2016).
47
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about a widely shared response to a thought experiment. Experimental jurisprudence can help assess the robustness of that
claim by seeking responses from a larger set of persons, including those who have little at stake in the theoretical debate.
Moreover, experimental jurisprudence can help assess questions about intuitions that are hard to address from the armchair.
For example, suppose that we tried to test the severity sensitivity of intentionality through thought experiments. Perhaps some
can intuitively discern that, all else equal, a very bad outcome
seems more intentionally produced than a moderately bad outcome. But it might be hard to feel very confident about those individual intuitions. Other, more subtle patterns of human judgment may be impossible to accurately assess just by thinking
hard. The experimental approach, which studies large samples
of people and assigns them to consider different versions of
thought experiments, can help detect more subtle patterns of
judgment, including ones that are not obvious or even introspectively accessible to an individual legal theorist.51
This example suggests some commonality between traditional jurisprudence and experimental jurisprudence. Both propose theories about legal concepts (e.g., the intentionality of a
foreseeable side effect depends on its severity), both test those
theories with (thought) experiments, and both revise the conceptual analysis in light of the findings. Perhaps “experimentation”
is neither unfamiliar nor unwelcome in jurisprudence.
At the same time, there are differences between the approaches. Traditional jurisprudence occurs in the seminar
room—or across the pages of law reviews—among professors
and scholars with significant training and expertise. Experimental jurisprudence normally begins online, by surveying laypeople with no special legal training. In analyzing the concepts
of legal intent, consent, cause, and reasonableness, why should
we think that the views of laypeople with no formal legal training are particularly helpful?
The remainder of this Article answers this question. Part II
details some examples of recent experimental jurisprudence,
proposing a framework to unify these diverse projects. Part III
51 Importantly, experimental jurisprudence does not simply compute answers to
legal questions. For example, the key takeaway from this empirical study is not that
judges and juries should now hold that foreseeable side effects are more “intentional” as
they become more severe. To the contrary, jurisprudential debate about that question
continues. See infra Part III.
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takes inspiration from philosopher John Gardner’s seminal
work,52 debunking “five-and-a-half” popular myths about experimental jurisprudence. In doing so, this Article distinguishes experimental jurisprudence from seemingly similar approaches to
legal scholarship. Part IV argues that experimental jurisprudence is particularly well placed to contribute to two central areas
of modern legal theory: the debate about “ordinary meaning” in
legal interpretation and the “New Private Law.” Together, these
Parts aim to clarify and justify the movement of experimental
jurisprudence, concluding that it should be understood as a
movement at the core of traditional jurisprudence.
II. SOME RECENT EXPERIMENTAL-JURISPRUDENCE RESEARCH
To understand the significance of the experimentaljurisprudence movement, it is instructive to study examples of
work in the area. This Part’s brief overview cannot do justice to
the enormous and ever-growing number of examples.53 This Part
highlights experimental-jurisprudence studies across several
areas: studies of mental states (including knowledge, recklessness, and intent), consent, causation, and law itself. But experimental jurisprudence has also studied criminal responsibility
and punishment,54 blame,55 justice,56 human rights,57 law and
52

John Gardner, Legal Positivism: 5 1/2 Myths, 46 AM. J. JURIS. 199 (2001).
For other introductions to the field of experimental jurisprudence, see generally
Stefan Magen & Karolina Prochownik, Legal X-Phi Bibliography, CTR. FOR L., BEHAV. &
COGNITION,
https://zrsweb.zrs.rub.de/institut/clbc/legal-x-phi-bibliography;
Niek
Strohmaier, Introducing: Experimental Jurisprudence, LEIDEN L. BLOG (Dec. 1, 2017),
https://perma.cc/EQ74-NRLU; Karolina Magdalena Prochownik, The Experimental Philosophy of Law: New Ways, Old Questions, and How Not to Get Lost, 16 PHIL. COMPASS
e12791 (2021); Roseanna Sommers, Experimental Jurisprudence: Psychologists Probe
Lay Understandings of Legal Constructs, 373 SCIENCE 394 (2021); and THE CAMBRIDGE
HANDBOOK OF EXPERIMENTAL JURISPRUDENCE (Kevin Tobia ed., forthcoming 2023).
54 See generally Mark Alicke, Culpable Causation, 63 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCH. 368 (1992); John M. Darley, Kevin M. Carlsmith & Paul H. Robinson, Incapacitation and Just Deserts as Motives for Punishment, 24 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 659 (2000);
Kevin M. Carlsmith, John M. Darley & Paul H. Robinson, Why Do We Punish? Deterrence and Just Deserts as Motives for Punishment, 83 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 284
(2002); Kenworthey Bilz & John M. Darley, What’s Wrong with Harmless Theories of
Punishment, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1215 (2004); John M. Darley, Morality in the Law:
The Psychological Foundations of Citizens’ Desires to Punish Transgressions, 5 ANN.
REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 1 (2009); Fiery Cushman, Crime and Punishment: Distinguishing the
Roles of Causal and Intentional Analyses in Moral Judgment, 108 COGNITION 353 (2008);
Fiery Cushman, Should the Law Depend on Luck, in FUTURE SCIENCE: ESSAYS FROM THE
CUTTING EDGE (Max Brockman ed., 2011); John M. Darley, Citizens’ Assignments of Punishments for Moral Transgressions: A Case Study in the Psychology of Punishment, 8
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 101 (2010); Thomas Nadelhoffer, Saeideh Heshmati, Deanna Kaplan
53
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morality,58 the internal point of view,59 abstract versus concrete
legal principles,60 state paternalism,61 nationality,62 identity and
& Shaun Nichols, Folk Retributivism and the Communication Confound, 29 ECON. &
PHIL. 235 (2013); Fiery Cushman, Punishment in Humans: From Intuitions to Institutions, 10 PHIL. COMPASS 117 (2015); Kenworthey Bilz, Testing the Expressive Theory of
Punishment, 13 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 358 (2016); Jessica Bregant, Alex Shaw &
Katherine D. Kinzler, Intuitive Jurisprudence: Early Reasoning About the Functions of
Punishment, 13 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 693 (2016); Eddy Nahmias & Eyal Aharoni,
Communicative Theories of Punishment and the Impact of Apology, in RETHINKING PUNISHMENT IN THE ERA OF MASS INCARCERATION 144 (Chris W. Surprenant ed., 2018); Karolina Prochownik, Do People with a Legal Background Dually Process? The Role of Causation, Intentionality and Pragmatic Linguistic Considerations in Judgments of
Criminal Responsibility, in THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE NATURALIZED 168 (Jerzy
Stelmach et al., eds., 2017); Karolina Prochownik & Matthias Unterhuber, Does the
Blame Blocking Effect for Assignments of Punishment Generalize to Legal Experts?, 43
COGNITIVE SCI. 2285 (2018); Markus Kneer & Edouard Machery, No Luck for Moral
Luck, 182 COGNITION 331 (2019); Paul C. Bauer & Andrei Poama, Does Suffering Suffice?
An Experimental Assessment of Desert Retributivism, 15 PLOS ONE e0230304 (2020);
James P. Dunlea & Larisa Heiphetz, Children’s and Adults’ Understanding of Punishment and the Criminal Justice System, 87 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCH. 1 (2020); James
P. Dunlea & Larisa Heiphetz, Children’s and Adults’ Views of Punishment as a Path to
Redemption, 92 CHILD DEV. e398 (2021); James P. Dunlea & Larisa Heiphetz, Language
Shapes Children’s Attitudes: Consequences of Internal, Behavioral, and Societal Information in Punitive and Non-punitive Contexts, J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCH.: GEN. (2021);
Justin W. Martin & Larisa Heiphetz, “Internally Wicked”: Investigating How and Why
Essentialism Influences Punitiveness and Moral Condemnation, 45 COGNITIVE SCI. 1
(2021); PAUL H. ROBINSON & JOHN M. DARLEY, JUSTICE, LIABILITY, AND BLAME: COMMUNITY VIEWS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW (1995); PAUL H. ROBINSON, DISTRIBUTIVE PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW: WHO SHOULD BE PUNISHED HOW MUCH? (2008); THE FUTURE OF
PUNISHMENT (Thomas A. Nadelhoffer ed., 2013).
55 See generally Mark D. Alicke & Teresa L. Davis, The Role of a Posteriori Victim
Information in Judgments of Blame and Sanction, 25 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCH. 362
(1989); Mark D. Alicke, Culpable Control and the Psychology of Blame, 126 PSYCH. BULL.
556 (2000); Lawrence M. Solan, Cognitive Foundations of the Impulse to Blame, 68
BROOK. L. REV. 1003 (2003); Karolina Prochownik, Alex Wiegmann & Joachim Horvath,
Blame Blocking and Expertise Effects Revisited, 43 PROC. ANN. MEETING COGNITIVE SCI.
SOC’Y 2323 (2021); Janice Nadler & Mary-Hunter McDonnell, Moral Character, Motive,
and the Psychology of Blame, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 255 (2012).
56 See generally John M. Darley, Citizens’ Sense of Justice and the Legal System, 10
CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCH. SCI. 10 (2001); John M. Darley & Thane S. Pittman, The
Psychology of Compensatory and Retributive Justice, 7 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. REV.
324 (2003).
57 See generally John Mikhail, Moral Grammar and Human Rights: Some Reflections on Cognitive Science and Enlightenment Rationalism, in UNDERSTANDING SOCIAL
ACTION, PROMOTING HUMAN RIGHTS 160 (Ryan Goodman et al. eds., 2012).
58 See generally Raff Donelson & Ivar R. Hannikainen, Fuller and the Folk: The Inner Morality of Law Revisited, in 3 OXFORD STUDIES IN EXPERIMENTAL PHILOSOPHY 6
(Tania Lombrozo et al. eds., 2020); Brian Flanagan & Ivar Hannikainen, The Folk Concept of Law: Law Is Intrinsically Moral, AUSTRALASIAN J. PHIL. (2020),
https://perma.cc/EF34-AZ6L; Bert I. Huang, Law’s Halo and the Moral Machine, 119
COLUM. L. REV. 1811 (2019); Bert I. Huang, Shallow Signals, 126 HARV. L. REV. 2227
(2013); Bert I. Huang, Law and Moral Dilemmas, 130 HARV. L. REV. 659 (2016) (reviewing F.M. KAMM, THE TROLLEY PROBLEM MYSTERIES (2015)).
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the self,63 free speech,64 custody decisions,65 happiness,66 lying,67
outcome severity,68 attempts,69 harm,70 liability,71 interpretation,72
59 See generally Leonard Hoeft, The Force of Norms? The Internal Point of View in
Light of Experimental Economics, 32 RATIO JURIS 339 (2019).
60 See generally Piotr Bystranowski, Bartosz Janik, Maciej Próchnicki, Ivar Rodriguez Hannikainen, Guilherme da Franca Couto Fernandes de Almeida & Noel Struchiner, Do Formalist Judges Abide by Their Abstract Principles? A Two-Country Study in
Adjudication, INT’L J. FOR SEMIOTICS L. (2021), https://perma.cc/A8AY-R8WA; Noel
Struchiner, Guilherme da F.C.F. de Almeida & Ivar R. Hannikainen, Legal DecisionMaking and the Abstract/Concrete Paradox, COGNITION (Sept. 3, 2020)
https://perma.cc/H8DT-UFA8.
61 See generally Ivar Hannikainen, Gabriel Cabral, Edouard Machery & Noel
Struchiner, A Deterministic Worldview Promotes Approval of State Paternalism, 70 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCH. 251 (2017).
62 See generally Larisa J. Hussak & Andrei Cimpian, “It Feels Like It’s in Your
Body”: How Children in the United States Think About Nationality, 148 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCH.: GEN. 1153 (2019).
63 See generally Daniel M. Bartels & Lance J. Rips, Psychological Connectedness
and Intertemporal Choice, 139 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCH.: GEN. 49 (2010); Brian D. Earp,
Joshua August Skorburg, Jim A.C. Everett & Julian Savulescu, Addiction, Identity, Morality, 10 AM. J. BIOETHICS: EMPIRICAL BIOETHICS 136 (2019); Sarah Molouki, Daniel M.
Bartels & Oleg Urminsky, A Longitudinal Study of Difference Between Predicted, Actual,
and Remembered Personal Change, 39 PROC. COGNITIVE SCI. SOC. 2748 (2017); Sarah
Molouki & Daniel M. Bartels, Personal Change and the Continuity of the Self, 93 COGNITIVE PSYCH. 1 (2017); George E. Newman, Paul Bloom & Joshua Knobe, Value Judgments and the True Self, 40 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. BULL. 203 (2014); Nina
Strohminger & Shaun Nichols, The Essential Moral Self, 131 COGNITION 159 (2014);
Kevin P. Tobia, Personal Identity and the Phineas Gage Effect, 75 ANALYSIS 396 (2015);
Kevin Patrick Tobia, Personal Identity, Direction of Change, and Neuroethics, 9 NEUROETHICS 37 (2016); Nina Strohminger & Shaun Nichols, Neurodegeneration and Identity,
26 PSYCH. SCI. 1469 (2015); Christian Mott, Statutes of Limitations and Personal Identity, in 2 OXFORD STUDIES IN EXPERIMENTAL PHILOSOPHY, supra note 58, at 243; James P.
Dunlea, Redeate G. Wolle & Larisa Heiphetz, The Essence of an Immigrant Identity:
Children’s Pro-social Response to Others Based on Perceived Ability and Desire to
Change, in EXPERIMENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF IDENTITY AND THE SELF (Kevin Tobia ed.,
2022); David Shoemaker & Kevin P. Tobia, Personal Identity, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
MORAL PSYCHOLOGY (forthcoming); Mihailis E. Diamantis, Limiting Identity in Criminal
Law, 60 B.C. L. REV. 2011 (2019) [hereinafter Limiting Identity]; Mihailis E. Diamantis, Corporate Identity, in EXPERIMENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF IDENTITY AND THE SELF (forthcoming 2022).
64 See generally Jonas De keersmaecker, Dries H. Bostyn, Alain Van Hiel & Arne
Roets, Disliked but Free to Speak: Cognitive Ability Is Related to Supporting Freedom of
Speech for Groups Across the Ideological Spectrum, 12 SOC. PSYCH. & PERSONALITY SCI.
34 (2021).
65 See generally Luiza Lopes Franco Costa, Ana Beatriz Dillon Esteves, Roxana
Kreimer, Noel Struchiner & Ivar Hannikainen, Gender Stereotypes Underlie Child Custody Decisions, 49 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCH. 548 (2019).
66 See generally Jonathan Phillips, Julian De Freitas, Christian Mott, June Gruber
& Joshua Knobe, True Happiness: The Role of Morality in the Folk Concept of Happiness,
146 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCH.: GEN. 165 (2017); Markus Kneer & Daniel M. Haybron,
Happiness and Well-Being: Is It All in Your Head? Evidence from the Folk (November
24, 2019) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author); John Bronsteen, Brian Leiter,
Jonathan Masur & Kevin Tobia, The Folk Theory of Well-Being (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
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evidence,73 settlement,74 contract,75 promise,76 ownership,77 disability,78 reasonableness,79 the balancing tests,80 and legal rules.81
67 See generally Emanuel Viebahn, Alex Wiegmann, Neele Engelmann & Pascale
Willemsen, Can a Question Be a Lie? An Empirical Investigation, ERGO (2020), available
at https://perma.cc/J9UX-LVM5; Alex Wiegmann & Jörg Meibauer, The Folk Concept of
Lying, 14 PHIL. COMPASS, no. 8, Aug. 2019.
68 See generally Kneer & Bourgeois-Gironde, supra note 38; Jeffrey J. Rachlinski,
Andrew J. Wistrich & Chris Guthrie, Altering Attention in Adjudication, 60 UCLA L.
REV. 1586 (2013); Markus Kneer, Reasonableness on the Clapham Omnibus: Exploring
the Outcome-Sensitive Folk Concept of Reasonable, in JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING: INTEGRATING EMPIRICAL AND THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES (forthcoming).
69 See generally Thomas Nadelhoffer, Attempts: In Ordinary Language and the
Criminal Law—A Commentary, 3 JURISPRUDENCE 475 (2012).
70 See generally Matthew B. Kugler, From Identification to Identity Theft: Public
Perceptions of Biometric Privacy Harms, 10 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 107 (2019).
71 See generally Joseph Sanders, Matthew B. Kugler, Lawrence M. Solan & John M.
Darley, Must Torts Be Wrongs? An Empirical Perspective, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1 (2014).
72 See generally Lawrence Solan, Terri Rosenblatt & Daniel Osherson, False Consensus Bias in Contract Interpretation, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1268 (2008); Matthew R.
Ginther, Francis X. Shen, Richard J. Bonnie, Morris B. Hoffman, Owen D. Jones, René
Marois & Kenneth W. Simons, The Language of Mens Rea, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1327 (2014);
Omri Ben-Shahar & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Interpreting Contracts via Surveys and Experiments, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1753 (2017); Jessica Bregant, Isabel Wellbery & Alex Shaw,
Crime but Not Punishment? Children Are More Lenient Toward Rule-Breaking when the
“Spirit of the Law” Is Unbroken, 178 J. EXPERIMENTAL CHILD PSYCH. 266 (2019); Noel
Struchiner, Ivar R. Hannikainen & Guilherme da F.C.F. de Almeida, An Experimental
Guide to Vehicles in the Park, 15 JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 312 (2020); Kevin P.
Tobia, Testing Ordinary Meaning, 134 HARV. L. REV. 726 (2020); Shlomo Klapper, Soren
Schmidt & Tor Tarantola, Ordinary Meaning from Ordinary People, U.C. IRVINE L. REV.
(unpublished manuscript); James Macleod, Finding Original Public Meaning, 56 GA. L.
REV. 1 (2022); Kevin Tobia, Brian G. Slocum & Victoria Nourse, Statutory Interpretation
from the Outside, 122 COLUM. L. REV. 213 (2022) [hereinafter Statutory Interpretation
from the Outside]; Julian Nyarko & Sarath Sanga, A Statistical Test for Legal Interpretation: Theory and Applications (Nov. 25, 2020) (unpublished manuscript), available at
https://perma.cc/7BCH-CQFY; Kevin Tobia, Brian G. Slocum & Victoria Nourse, Progressive Textualism, 110 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2022) [hereinafter Progressive Textualism].
73 See generally Bilz, supra note 1; Avani Mehta Sood, Cognitive Cleansing: Experimental Psychology and the Exclusionary Rule, 103 GEO. L.J. 1543 (2015); Susan A.
Bandes & Jessica M. Salerno, Emotion, Proof and Prejudice: The Cognitive Science of
Gruesome Photos and Victim Impact Statements, 46 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1003 (2014); Andreas
Glöckner & Christoph Engel, Can We Trust Intuitive Jurors? Standards of Proof and the
Probative Value of Evidence in Coherence-Based Reasoning, 10 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL
STUD. 230 (2013).
74 See generally Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychology, Economics, and Settlement: A New Look at the Role of the Lawyer, 76 TEX. L. REV. 77 (1997); Jessica Bregant, Jennifer K. Robbennolt & Verity Winship, Perceptions of Settlement, 27 HARV.
NEGOT. L. REV. 93 (2022); John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco & Jonathan S. Masur,
Hedonic Adaptation and the Settlement of Civil Lawsuits, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1516 (2008).
75 See generally Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Do Liquidated Damages Encourage Breach?
A Psychological Experiment, 108 MICH. L. REV. 633 (2010); Tess Wilkinson-Ryan & Jonathan Baron, Moral Judgment and Moral Heuristics in Breach of Contract, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 405 (2009); David A. Hoffman & Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, The Psychology of Contract Precautions, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 395 (2013); Tess Wilkinson-Ryan &
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This research has focused largely on lay judgment, but some
of it has studied populations with legal training, including law

David A. Hoffman, The Common Sense of Contract Formation, 67 STAN. L. REV. 1269
(2015); Takeyoshi Kawashima, The Legal Consciousness of Contract in Japan, 7 LAW IN
JAPAN 1 (1974); Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, The Perverse Consequences of Disclosing Standard
Terms, 103 CORNELL L. REV. 117 (2017); Meirav Furth-Matzkin & Roseanna Sommers,
Consumer Psychology and the Problem of Fine-Print Fraud, 72 STAN. L. REV. 503 (2020).
76 See generally Christoph Vanberg, Why Do People Keep Their Promises? An Experimental Test of Two Explanations, 76 ECONOMETRICA 1467 (2008); Gary Charness &
Martin Dufwenberg, Bare Promises: An Experiment, 107 ECON. LETTERS 281 (2010); Tess
Wilkinson-Ryan, Legal Promise and Psychological Contract, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
843 (2012); Florian Ederer & Alexander Stremitzer, Moral Intuitions of Promise Keeping,
65 PRINCIPIA 5 (2018) [hereinafter Moral Intuitions]; Florian Ederer & Alexander Stremitzer, Promises and Expectations, 106 GAMES & ECON. BEHAV. 161 (2017); Dorothee
Mischkowski, Rebecca Stone & Alexander Stremitzer, Promises, Expectations, and Social
Cooperation, 62 J.L. & ECON. 687 (2019); Rebecca Stone & Alexander Stremitzer, Promises, Reliance, and Psychological Lock-In, 49 J. LEGAL STUD. 33 (2020) [hereinafter Promises, Reliance, and Psychological Lock-In].
77 See generally Shaylene E. Nancekivell, Ori Friedman & Susan A. Gelman, Ownership Matters: People Possess a Naïve Theory of Ownership, 23 TRENDS IN COGNITIVE
SCIS. 102 (2019); Shaylene E. Nancekivell, Charles J. Millar, Pauline C. Summers & Ori
Friedman, Ownership Rights, in A COMPANION TO EXPERIMENTAL PHILOSOPHY 247 (Justin Sytsma & Wesley Buckwalter eds., 2016); Ori Friedman, Madison L. Pesowski &
Brandon W. Goulding, Legal Ownership Is Psychological: Evidence from Young Children,
in PSYCHOLOGICAL OWNERSHIP AND CONSUMER BEHAVIOR 19 (Joann Peck & Suzanne B.
Shu eds., 2018); Patricia Kanngiesser & Bruce M. Hood, Young Children’s Understanding of Ownership Rights for Newly Made Objects, 29 COGNITIVE DEV. 30 (2014); Ori
Friedman, Julia W. Van de Vondervoort, Margaret A. Defeyter & Karen R. Neary, First
Possession, History, and Young Children’s Ownership Judgments, 84 CHILD DEV. 1519
(2013); Shaylene E. Nancekivell, Julia W. Van de Vondervoort & Ori Friedman, Young
Children’s Understanding of Ownership, 7 CHILD DEV. PERSPS. 243 (2013); Peter DeScioli,
Rachel Karpoff & Julian De Freitas, Ownership Dilemmas: The Case of Finders Versus
Landowners, 41 COGNITIVE SCI. 502 (2017); Margaret Echelbarger, Steven O. Roberts &
Susan A. Gelman, Children’s Concerns for Equity and Ownership in Contexts of Individual-Based and Group-Based Inequality, J. COGNITION & DEV. (2021).
78 See generally Doron Dorfman, Suspicious Species, 2021 U. ILL. L. REV. 1363;
Doron Dorfman, [Un]usual Suspects: Deservingness, Scarcity, and Disability Rights, 10
U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 557 (2020).
79 See generally Kevin P. Tobia, How People Judge What is Reasonable, 70 ALA. L.
REV. 293 (2018); Igor Grossman, Richard P. Eibach, Jacklyn Koyama & Qaisar B. Sahi,
Folk Standards of Sound Judgment; Rationality Versus Reasonableness, 6 SCI. ADVANCES (2020); Christopher Brett Jaeger, The Empirical Reasonable Person, 72 ALA. L. REV.
887 (2021); Mikaela Spruill & Neil A. Lewis Jr., Legal Descriptions of Police Officers Affect How Citizens Judge Them, 101 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCH., July 2022. Experimental work also suggests that ordinary people overestimate the cognitive skills that
people possess. See generally Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Misunderstanding Ability, Misallocating Responsibility, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 1055 (2003); Kneer & Haybron, supra note 68.
80 See generally Christoph Engel & Rima Maria Rahal, Justice Is in the Eyes of the
Beholder – Eye Tracking Evidence on Balancing Normative Concerns in Torts Cases
(Jan. 2020) (unpublished discussion paper) (on file with author).
81 See generally Struchiner et al., supra note 72; Statutory Interpretation from the
Outside, supra note 72.
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students and judges.82 And while much of this work involves
U.S. participants, today’s experimental-jurisprudence movement
is the product of international efforts; some of the most impressive examples are conducted by researchers outside the United
States—for example, by researchers in Brazil, Spain, Lithuania
and Germany.83 Recent studies have also emphasized the importance of cross-cultural samples, employing cross-cultural and
cross-linguistic studies.84
Finally, it is difficult to precisely categorize whether some
studies fall neatly into “experimental jurisprudence.” The research has important connections to research in behavioral
law and economics, 85 legal heuristics and biases, 86 motivated
82 Progressive Textualism, supra note 72, at 762. See also generally Tobia et al., supra note 72; Kneer & Bourgeois-Gironde, supra note 38; Holger Spamann & Lars Klöhn,
Justice Is Less Blind, and Less Legalistic, than We Thought: Evidence from an Experiment with Real Judges, 45 J. LEGAL STUD. 255 (2016); Daniel Klerman & Holger Spamann, Law Matters – Less Than We Thought (Jan. 19, 2021) (U.S.C. L. Sch. working
paper) (on file with author).
83 See, e.g., Struchiner et al., supra note 72; Vilius Dranseika, Jonas Dagys & Renatas Besniunas, Proper Names, Rigidity, and Empirical Studies on Judgments of Identity Across Transformations, 39 TOPOI 381 (2020); Kneer & Bourgeois-Gironde, supra
note 38.
84 See generally Ivar R. Hannikainen, et al., Are There Cross-Cultural Legal Principles? Modal Reasoning Uncovers Procedural Constraints on Law, 45 COGNITIVE SCI.,
no. 8, Aug. 2021; Holger Spamann, Lars Klöhn, Christophe Jamin, Vikramaditya Khanna, John Zhuang Liu, Pavan Mamidi, Alexander Morell & Ivan Reidel, Judges in the
Lab: No Precedent Effects, No Common/Civil Law Differences, 13 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 110
(2021); John Zhuang Liu, Lars Klöhn & Holger Spamann, Precedent and Chinese Judges:
An Experiment, 69 AM. J. COMPAR. L. 93 (2021).
85 See generally Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Psychological Foundations of Behavioral
Law and Economics, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 1675.
86 See generally Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Judging by Heuristic: Cognitive Illusions in Judicial Decision Making, 86 JUDICATURE 44
(2002); Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Blinking on the
Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (2007); Erin M. Harley, Hindsight Bias in Legal Decision Making, 25 SOC. COGNITION 48 (2007); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski,
Sheri Johnson, Andrew J. Wistrich & Chris Guthrie, Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195 (2009); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Chris
Guthrie & Andrew J. Wistrich, Probable Cause, Probability, and Hindsight, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 72 (2011); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Heuristics and Biases in the Courts:
Ignorance or Adaptation?, 79 OR. L. REV. 61 (2000); Andrew J. Wistrich, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski
& Chris Guthrie, Heart Versus Head: Do Judges Follow the Law or Follow Their Feelings?, 93 TEX. L. REV. 855 (2015); Moa Lidén, Minna Gräns & Peter Juslin, ‘Guilty, No
Doubt’: Detention Provoking Confirmation Bias in Judges’ Guilt Assessments and Debiasing Techniques, 25 PSYCH., CRIME & L. 219 (2018); Moa Lidén, Minna Gräns & Peter
Juslin, From Devil’s Advocate to Crime Fighter: Confirmation Bias and Debiasing Techniques in Prosecutorial Decision-Making, 25 PSYCH., CRIME & L. 494 (2018); Christoph K.
Winter, The Value of Behavioral Economics for EU Judicial Decision-Making, 21 GERMAN L.J. 240 (2020); Andreas Glöckner & Christoph Engel, Role-Induced Bias in Court:
An Experimental Analysis, 26 BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 272 (2013); David E. Melnikoff

750

The University of Chicago Law Review

[89:3

reasoning,87 experimental bioethics,88 experimental longtermism,89 and research in law and corpus linguistics.90
The remainder of this Part turns to some recent examples of
experimental jurisprudence. Again, most of these examples
study ordinary concepts, for example, how laypeople evaluate
what is “intentional” or “consensual.” Those studies are typically
embedded within a particular jurisprudential debate—questions
about the nature of intent or causation. But (at the risk of oversimplifying), it may be useful to introduce one broader hypothesis that is relevant to many recent studies.
This hypothesis is the “folk-law thesis.”91 Broadly speaking,
the claim is that ordinary concepts are at the heart of legal concepts. For example, this account would predict that the legal
concept of causation reflects features of the ordinary concept of
causation and that the legal concept of consent reflects features
of the ordinary concept of consent. If this were true, it would
provide one general reason for jurisprudential scholars to evaluate empirical research about ordinary concepts. If there are surprising features of ordinary concepts to be discovered, such dis-

& Nina Strohminger, The Automatic Influence of Advocacy on Lawyers and Novices, 4
NATURE HUM. BEHAV. 1258 (2020).
87 See generally Dan M. Kahan, David Hoffman, Danieli Evans, Neal Devins &
Eugene Lucci, “Ideology” or “Situation Sense”? An Experimental Investigation of Motivated Reasoning and Professional Judgment, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 349 (2016).
88 See generally Brian D. Earp et al., Experimental Philosophical Bioethics, 11 AM.
J. BIOETHICS: EMPIRICAL BIOETHICS 30 (2020); Brian D. Earp, Stephen R. Latham &
Kevin P. Tobia, Personal Transformation and Advance Directives: An Experimental Bioethics Approach, 20 AM. J. BIOETHICS 72 (2020); Emilian Mihailov, Ivar R. Hannikainen
& Brian D. Earp, Advancing Methods in Empirical Bioethics: Bioxphi Meets Digital
Technologies, 21 AM. J. BIOETHICS 53 (2021).
89 See generally Eric Martínez & Christoph Winter, Experimental Longtermist Jurisprudence, in ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF LAW (S. Magan & K.
Prochownik eds., 2022).
90 See generally Davide Mazzi, “Our Reading Would Lead to . . . ”: Corpus Perspectives on Pragmatic Argumentation in U.S. Supreme Court Judgments, 3 J. ARGUMENTATION IN CONTEXT 103 (2014); Justin Sytsma, Roland Bluhm, Pascale Willemsen & Kevin
Reuter, Causal Attributions and Corpus Analysis, in METHODOLOGICAL ADVANCES IN
EXPERIMENTAL PHILOSOPHY 209 (Eugen Fischer & Mark Curtis eds., 2019); MICHAEL
STUBBS, TEXT AND CORPUS ANALYSIS: COMPUTER-ASSISTED STUDIES OF LANGUAGE AND
CULTURE (1996); Thomas R. Lee & Stephen C. Mouritsen, Judging Ordinary Meaning,
127 YALE L.J. 788 (2018).
91 Professors Steve Guglielmo, Andrew Monroe and Bertram Malle propose that
folk psychology may also be at the heart of morality. See Steve Guglielmo, Andrew E.
Monroe & Bertram F. Malle, At the Heart of Morality Lies Folk Psychology, 52 INQUIRY
449 (2009); Kevin Tobia, Law and the Cognitive Science of Ordinary Concepts, in LAW
AND MIND: A SURVEY OF LAW AND THE COGNITIVE SCIENCES 86 (Bartosz Brożek et al.
eds., 2021).
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coveries might also constitute discoveries of features of legal
concepts. For example, a discovery about how people understand
ordinary cause (or intent, or consent, or reasonableness) might
actually enrich our understanding of the legal notion of cause (or
intent, or consent, or reasonableness).
The strong version of this thesis holds that a given legal
concept is identical to its ordinary counterpart. The weak version holds that a given legal concept shares some features of the
ordinary concept. Even if the strong version of the thesis is false
(with respect to a given concept), the weaker folk-law thesis may
prove useful in structuring inquiry. For example, learning more
about the ordinary concept can help clarify what is, in fact, distinct about the legal concept.
This Part’s order of presentation reflects the breadth of experimental jurisprudence. Much of the best-known experimental
jurisprudence studies concepts that are specifically referenced in
law: knowledge, intent, and consent. But experimental jurisprudence also studies concepts that are not explicitly referenced as
outcome-determinative ones, such as the concept of personal
identity—or even law itself. Finally, experimental jurisprudence
studies broader classes of concepts. For example, in addition to
studying the specific concept of causation (which is relevant to
the law of tort negligence because it uses the criterion “cause”),
it also studies a broader type of causal reasoning (which is relevant to employment-law rules analyzing whether some act was
performed “because of” X or whether some act “results from” X).
This Part concludes with some broader considerations about
the nature of experimental jurisprudence, in light of this investigation. Although experimental jurisprudence often focuses on
studying terms cited explicitly in law (e.g., “consent”), this is not
its primary criterion. Rather, experimental jurisprudence might
study any ordinary concept that has a counterpart of legal significance. For example, it studies the ordinary concepts of intent
or cause to inform legal theorizing about intent or cause. But it
also studies ordinary concepts that do not have counterparts
that appear prominently as terms in jury instructions, for example, responsibility and the self. As such, the key question in
identifying an area of potential experimental-jurisprudential
study is not whether a term is cited explicitly in some legal rule
but rather which concepts have jurisprudential significance.
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A. Significant Examples
1. Mental states (knowledge, recklessness, intent).
From criminal law mens rea to the distinction between intentional and unintentional torts, mental states have great legal
significance. What is knowledge, recklessness, or intent? Experimental jurisprudence has contributed to these legal questions by studying these ordinary concepts.92
As a first example, consider the legal distinction between
knowledge and recklessness. Professor Iris Vilares and her coauthors sought to test whether there is an ordinary distinction
between knowledge and recklessness. To do so, they ran a neuroscientific experiment, evaluating whether different brain
states were associated with different attributions of knowledge
and recklessness.93
They conducted an fMRI study involving a “contraband scenario.”94 Participants evaluated different scenarios in which they
could carry a suitcase—which might have contraband in it—
through a security checkpoint.95 The probability that the suitcase had contraband varied across different scenarios. In some
scenarios, participants were completely sure that the suitcase
had contraband (knowledge condition) while in others, there was
merely a risk that the suitcase had contraband (recklessness
condition).96
The study found that participants’ evaluations of the two
states (knowledge, recklessness) differed and were associated
92 See generally DARLEY & ROBINSON, supra note 54; Bertram F. Malle & Sarah E.
Nelson, Judging Mens Rea: The Tension Between Folk Concepts and Legal Concepts of
Intentionality, 21 BEHAV. SCIS. & L. 563 (2003); Thomas Nadelhoffer, Bad Acts, Blameworthy Agents, and Intentional Actions: Some Problems for Juror Impartiality, 9. PHIL.
EXPL. 203 (2006); Thomas Nadelhoffer & Eddy Nahmias, Neuroscience, Free Will, Folk
Intuitions, and the Criminal Law, 36 THURGOOD MARSHALL L. REV. 157 (2011); Pam A.
Mueller, Lawrence M. Solan & John M. Darley, When Does Knowledge Become Intent?
Perceiving the Minds of Wrongdoers, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 859 (2012); James A.
Macleod, Belief States in Criminal Law, 68 OKLA. L. REV. 497 (2016); Lara Kirfel & Ivar
R. Hannikainen, Why Blame the Ostrich? Understanding Culpability for Willful Ignorance, in ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF LAW, supra note 89; Kneer &
Bourgeois-Gironde, supra note 38; Ginther et al., supra note 72.
93 Iris Vilares, Michael J. Wesley, Woo-Young Ahn, Richard J. Bonnie, Morris
Hoffman, Owen D. Jones, Stephen J. Morse, Gideon Yaffe, Terry Lohrenz & P. Read
Montague, Predicting the Knowledge–Recklessness Distinction in the Human Brain, 114
PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 3222 (2017).
94 Id. at 3223.
95 Id.
96 Id.
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with different brain regions.97 Moreover, the fMRI data predicted whether participants faced a knowledge or recklessness scenario.98 The researchers took this as evidence that the legal concepts are, in part, running parallel to an ordinary distinction.99
This finding suggests that the legal categories of knowledge and
recklessness are actually founded on the ordinary notions.
Many other experimental studies have evaluated
knowledge100 and intent.101 As one example, Markus Kneer and
colleagues have found that ordinary people are sometimes sensitive to the severity of a side effect when judging whether it was
produced intentionally.102 Recall this Article’s earliest hypothetical about life-saving negligence.103 The company aimed to sell
yachts, which would raise money for them and for charity, but
that production decision had one bad side effect: creating pollution. Did the company intentionally pollute? Research shows
that in these cases, people are more inclined to judge that the
pollution is intentionally produced when it is deadly than when

97

Id. at 3224.
Vilares et al., supra note 93, at 3224.
99 Id. at 3226.
100 See generally David Rose et al., Nothing at Stake in Knowledge, 53 NOÛS 224
(2019); Edouard Machery et al., The Gettier Intuition from South America to Asia, 34 J.
INDIAN COUNCIL PHIL. RSCH. 517 (2017).
101 See generally Malle & Nelson, supra note 92; Thomas Allen Nadelhoffer III, Intentions and Intentional Actions in Ordinary Language and the Criminal Law (2005)
(Ph.D. dissertation, Fla. St. Univ.) (on file with author); Nadelhoffer, supra note 92; Sydney Levine, John Mikhail & Alan M. Leslie, Presumed Innocent? How Tacit Assumptions
of Intentional Structure Shape Moral Judgment, 147 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCH.: GEN.
1728 (2018); John Mikhail, Moral Grammar and Intuitive Jurisprudence: A Formal
Model of Unconscious Moral and Legal Knowledge, 50 PSYCH. LEARNING & MOTIVATION
27 (2009); Julia Kobick & Joshua Knobe, Interpreting Intent: How Research on Folk
Judgments of Intentionality Can Inform Statutory Analysis, 75 BROOK. L. REV. 409
(2009); Julia Kobick, Note, Discriminatory Intent Reconsidered: Folk Concepts of Intentionality and Equal Protection Jurisprudence, 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 517 (2010); Karolina Prochownik, Melina Krebs, Alex Wiegmann & Joachim Horvath, Not as Bad as
Painted? Legal Expertise, Intentionality Ascription, and Outcome Effects Revisited, in 42
PROC. ANN. CONF. COGNITIVE SCI. SOC’Y 1930 (2020); Francis X. Shen, Morris B. Hoffman, Owen D. Jones, Joshua D. Greene & René Marois, Sorting Guilty Minds, 86 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1306 (2011).
102 See generally Markus Kneer, The Side-Effect Effect as an Instance of a Severity
Effect (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author); Markus Kneer, Ivar Hannikainen,
Marc-André Zehnder & Guilherme Almeida, The Severity Effect on Intention and
Knowledge. A Cross-Cultural Study with Laypeople and Legal Experts (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author).
103 See supra Part I.
98
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it is nonfatal.104 In other words, the severity of a side-effect affects participants’ attributions of intentionality.
These studies about ordinary concepts raise intriguing jurisprudential questions. In an approach similar to that of traditional jurisprudence, experimental-jurisprudence scholars evaluate the source of these judgments: Is severity sensitivity a
performance error (a mistaken intuition in response to the
thought experiment)? They also ask normative questions:
Should the legal criterion of intentional action reflect this “severity sensitivity” feature of the ordinary concept? In response to
this latter question, some argue no,105 while others have raised
considerations in favor of yes.106 As in traditional jurisprudence,
these debates are not easily resolved. But learning more about
the ordinary concept raises new and important questions about
how law should understand knowledge, recklessness, intent, and
other mental states.
2. Consent.
As another example, consider the experimental jurisprudence study of consent. Exciting recent work in this area comes
from Professor Roseanna Sommers, who has investigated the
ordinary understanding of consent across a range of legal contexts. One important line of her work focuses on the relationship
between deception and consent. “Under the canonical view, material deception vitiates consent.”107 When someone’s agreement
is gained through deception about a material fact, there is not
valid consent. For example, imagine that I offer to sell you a car
with “only ten thousand miles,” and you agree. In reality, the car
has one hundred thousand miles. Your agreement would not be
consensual if you relied upon my misrepresentation.
Sommers’s experimental jurisprudence of consent has
found, however, that ordinary people often attribute “consent” in
circumstances in which there has been significant deception.108
104 See generally Kneer & Bourgeois-Gironde, supra note 38. Cf. generally Knobe,
supra note 38.
105 See, e.g., Kneer & Bourgeois-Gironde, supra note 38, at 140.
106 See, e.g., Kevin P. Tobia, Legal Concepts and Legal Expertise 68 (Feb. 10, 2020)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
107 Roseanna Sommers, Commonsense Consent, 129 YALE L.J. 2232, 2252 (2020).
108 Id. See also generally Joanna Demaree-Cotton & Roseanna Sommers, Autonomy
and the Folk Concept of Valid, Consent, 224 COGNITION (2022); Roseanna Sommers &
Vanessa K. Bohns, The Voluntariness of Voluntary Consent: Consent Searches and the
Psychology of Compliance, 128 YALE. L.J. 1962 (2019); Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, A Psycho-
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In one of Sommers’s experimental hypotheticals, a single woman
does not desire to sleep with married men. The woman asks a
potential partner about his marital status, and he lies, saying
that he is not married.109 The woman then agrees to sleep with
him. In this case, the overwhelming majority of participants
judged that the woman did “give consent to sleep with [the
man].”110 Despite deception regarding a very important fact (the
man’s marital status), most people attribute consent.111
Given the crucial role that consent plays across tort, criminal, and contract law, these findings raise broad questions.112 Is
the legal notion of consent consistent with the ordinary concept?
Of course, this experiment does not settle this complex jurisprudential question. But it does provide the longstanding jurisprudential debate with unique insights. For example, Sommers’s
further studies suggest that the source of this intuition is something about what seems to be an “essential” part of the agreement.113 Deception about the essence of the contract or arrangement vitiates consent, but deception about less essential
features does not. Here again, this data does not settle the debate about how law should identify the right criteria of legal
consent. But it provides important new insight into a jurisprudential analysis; if our intuitions about what seems consensual
depend on our view of what is essential to the agreement (rather
than what’s merely material), does that give us any reason to
revise the legal notion of consent?

logical Account of Consent to Fine Print, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1745 (2014); ROBINSON & DARLEY, supra note 54. Empirical work suggests that people are afraid to decline police officers’ requests and feel pressure to consent to searches. See generally, e.g., Janice Nadler
& J.D. Trout, The Language of Consent in Police Encounters, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
LANGUAGE AND LAW 326 (Peter M. Tiersma & Lawrence M. Solan eds., 2012).
109 Sommers, supra note 107, at 2252.
110 Id.
111 Note that the same finding arises for various types of deception and various
question types: did the woman “let [the man] have sex with her,” or did she “give [the
man] permission to have sex with her.” Id. at 2323. This relates to the discussion, infra,
of classes of concepts. Many take experimental jurisprudence to focus primarily on concepts cited by law (e.g., consent). But experimental jurisprudence studies a wide range of
concepts and classes of concepts that have legal significance.
112 Hurd, supra note 36, at 123 (“[C]onsent turns a trespass into a dinner party; a
battery into a handshake; a theft into a gift; an invasion of privacy into an intimate moment; a commercial appropriation of name and likeness into a biography.”).
113 Sommers, supra note 107, at 2301.
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3. Causation.
As a third example, turn to experimental jurisprudence of
causation. Jurisprudence has long studied “the plain man’s notions of causation.”114 Experimental jurisprudence makes new
progress on that traditional inquiry.115
When thinking about potential causes, there are several
plausible features of significance. One is the potential cause’s
necessity: Would the outcome have occurred if not for the cause?
A second is its sufficiency: Was the cause enough to bring about
the outcome?
Studies in cognitive science have shown that the ordinary
concept of causation is informed by both of these features.116 Professor James Macleod has recently conducted important work in
this area, designing a study to test whether this feature of the
ordinary concept also manifests in people’s judgments about
cases of legal causation.117 He considered three legal examples: a
scenario asking whether death “result[ed] from” a certain drug,
a scenario asking whether an employee was terminated “because

114

HART & HONORÉ, supra note 16, at 1.
See generally Barbara A. Spellman, Crediting Causality, 126 J. EXPERIMENTAL
PSYCH.: GEN. 323 (1997); Erich J. Greene & John M. Darley, Effects of Necessary, Sufficient, and Indirect Causation on Judgments of Criminal Liability, 22 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 429 (1998); Lawrence M. Solan & John M. Darley, Causation, Contribution, and
Legal Liability: An Empirical Study, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 265 (2001); Robert A.
Prentice & Jonathan J. Koehler, A Normality Bias in Legal Decision Making, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 583 (2003); David A. Lagnado & Shelley Channon, Judgments of Cause and
Blame: The Effects of Intentionality and Foreseeability, 108 COGNITION 754 (2008);
Christopher Hitchcock & Joshua Knobe, Cause and Norm, 106 J. PHIL. 587 (2009); Barbara A. Spellman & Christopher R. Holland, When Knowledge Matters to Causation, 5
ANN. CONF. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. (2010); Mark Alicke, David Rose & Dori Bloom,
Causation, Norm Violation and Culpable Control, 108 J. PHIL. 670 (2011); Jonathan F.
Kominsky, Jonathan Phillips, Tobias Gerstenberg, David Lagnado & Joshua Knobe,
Causal Superseding, 137 COGNITION 196 (2015); Paul Henne, Ángel Pinillos & Felipe De
Brigard, Cause by Omission and Norm: Not Watering Plants, 95 AUSTRALASIAN J. PHIL.
270 (2017); James A. Macleod, Ordinary Causation: A Study in Experimental Statutory
Interpretation, 94 IND. L.J. 957 (2019); Lara Kirfel & David Lagnado, Causal Judgments
About Atypical Actions Are Influenced by Agents’ Epistemic States, 212 COGNITION 1
(2021); David A. Lagnado & Tobias Gerstenberg, Causation in Legal and Moral Reasoning, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CAUSAL REASONING 565 (Michael R. Waldmann ed.,
2017); Pascale Willemsen & Lara Kirfel, Recent Empirical Work on the Relationship Between Causal Judgments and Norms, 14 PHIL. COMPASS, no. 1, Jan. 2019; Levin Güver &
Markus Kneer, Causation and the Silly Norm Effect, in ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW (2022).
116 See Joshua Knobe & Scott Shapiro, Proximate Cause Explained: An Essay in Experimental Jurisprudence, 88 U. CHI. L. REV. 165, 235 (2021).
117 See generally Macleod, supra note 115.
115
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of” his age, and a scenario asking whether someone was assaulted “because of” his religion.118
Participants considered one of four types of cases, each of
which varied whether the cause was necessary or sufficient to
bring about an outcome:
(i) necessary and sufficient,
(ii) necessary but not sufficient,
(iii) sufficient but not necessary, or
(iv) not sufficient and not necessary.119
For example, in the drug case, a protagonist buys three different drugs, one from each of three different dealers. The drug
that participants were asked about may have been (i) the only
drug potent enough to kill by itself, (ii) the only drug potent
enough to kill when combined with either of the others, (iii) one
of three drugs potent enough to kill by itself, or (iv) one of several drugs potent enough to kill when combined with any other.
That experiment made two striking discoveries. First, people attributed causation in cases in which the cause was not a
but-for cause (i.e., (iii) and (iv)). Second, sufficiency had an important effect on ordinary judgments of causation.120 These findings cohere with recent cognitive-scientific findings that ordinary judgments of causation are influenced by both necessity
and sufficiency.121
4. Law.
The preceding examples involve concepts that law cites explicitly: intent, consent, and cause. But experimental jurisprudence also studies some ordinary concepts that have a less explicit legal connection. This next example serves as a proof of
this concept.
Consider the concept of law itself. Professors Raff Donelson
and Ivar Hannikainen examined how ordinary people understand law. In an important series of experiments, they tested

118

Id. at 995.
Id. at 996.
120 Id. at 999–1000.
121 Recent cognitive science has also highlighted another significant factor in ordinary judgments of causation: (ab)normality. See generally Knobe & Shapiro, supra
note 116; Andrew Summers, Common-Sense Causation in the Law, 38 OXFORD J. LEGAL
STUD. 793 (2018); Solan & Darley, supra note 115.
119
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whether ordinary people (and legal experts) endorsed Fuller’s
conditions of the inner morality of law.122
In one experiment, they investigated whether people think
that law has to be consistent, general, intelligible, public, and
stable. That study asked two questions. First, are these conditions of law seen as necessary? Second, do laws in practice observe these principles? The responses—from ordinary people
and experts alike—are fascinating. There was strong endorsement of the conditions as principles of law. Yet participants also
agreed that there are some laws that are (in fact) not prospective, stable, intelligible, or general.123 A recent cross-cultural collaboration has replicated the results from this study across eleven different countries.124
As with the other experimental-jurisprudential studies, the
lesson here is not for the law to simply reflect the ordinary notion. (Donelson and Hannikainen do not recommend that law
have a self-contradictory nature.) Rather, the experiment adds
insight to traditional jurisprudential debates: What features do
we believe laws must and do have? And what explains those
judgments?
B. A Framework for Identifying Experimental Jurisprudence
This summary, although not entirely brief, has only
scratched the surface. Before turning to the next Part, it is
worth elaborating what connects these very diverse projects.
One common view is that XJur studies ordinary language and
concepts that are invoked explicitly in law. Where the law invokes intent or consent, XJur studies the ordinary concept of intent or consent.
XJur does study those concepts but not because of their explicit legal citation. A more useful criterion is whether the legal
object of study has an ordinary-language or ordinary-conceptual
counterpart. This difference is clarified in Figure 1 below.

122
123
124

Donelson & Hannikainen, supra note 58, at 10.
Id. at 18.
Hannikainen et al., supra note 84, at 10.

2022]

Experimental Jurisprudence

759

FIGURE 1: A HEURISTIC FOR IDENTIFYING EXPERIMENTAL
JURISPRUDENCE

Does the
legally significant object of
study have an
ordinary
counterpart?

Is the object of study referred to explicitly in
legal materials (e.g., judicial opinions, statutes,
or jury instructions)?
Frequently
Rarely
Yes Cause; consent;
Numerical identity;
intent; reasonable responsibility;
the concept of law
No Parol evidence
Legal positivism;
rule; stare decisis soft law

It may seem that the only objects of XJur’s study are those
that are invoked explicitly in legal materials. This is partly a result of the (mistaken) view that experimental jurisprudence is
principally concerned with predicting how judges or juries will
decide cases.125 Of course, many experimental-jurisprudence
studies have focused on those concepts. Unsurprisingly, many
important legal concepts also appear with regularity in real legal texts.
However, this criterion—what terms and phrases appear
explicitly in legal materials—will not direct us to every useful
experimental-jurisprudential project. Many other notions are
rarely invoked explicitly in law but are crucial jurisprudential
concepts nevertheless. These include concepts of personal identity and the self, (moral) blame and responsibility, and the concept of law itself.
To take just one example, consider the concept of “numerical
identity.” This is a crucial legal concept.126 It is implicated as a
necessary criterion of most interesting diachronic legal relations.
When are you bound by that contract? Only when you are the
same person as one of the parties who originally agreed to it.
When does he deserve criminal punishment? Only when he is
the same person as the one who committed the crime. Yet numerical identity is hardly ever cited explicitly by courts.127
The same is true of other important legal concepts: although
courts cite “law,” it is rare for a case to turn on the concept of
125

See infra Part III.C.
See generally K.T. Matsumura, Binding Future Selves, 75 LA. L. REV. 71 (2014);
James Toomey, Narrative Capacity, 100 N.C. L. REV. (forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at
32–38) (on file with author).
127 A Westlaw search, across all state and federal jurisdictions, returned ten cases.
126
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law or on the concept of soft law. That said, there is not much to
learn from studying the ordinary concept of the parol evidence
rule, insofar as it has no ordinary-language counterpart.128 The
better
criterion
for
identifying
useful
experimentaljurisprudential inquiries is whether the legal object has a corresponding ordinary-language counterpart. Because experimental
jurisprudence often focuses on ordinary cognition,129 these ordinary concepts are the most valuable to study.
The more useful criterion is whether a counterpart of some
ordinary concept plays an important role in the law. This is true
of ordinary concepts whose counterparts are cited explicitly
(such as the ordinary notion of what is reasonable, consensual,
or self-defense) but also ones that are not explicitly cited (such
as the ordinary notion of numerical identity or of the concept of
law itself).
Before turning to the next Part, there is one final wrinkle.
XJur often focuses on specific legally significant concepts, such
as ownership. But sometimes it focuses on broader classes of
concepts, for example, studying how law treats concepts that
admit of a broad range of potential category members.130
One example is Macleod’s important work on causation.131
His studies examine lay judgments of vignettes that use different
phrases—such as “because of” and “result from”—that are taken
to reflect ordinary causal reasoning. Another example is Sommers’s work on consent.132 Those experiments study judgments
about consent and also whether a person “willingly” acted or
gave “permission.”133
These experiments report similar patterns of judgment
across vignettes using these varied terms, and they reveal something more general about ordinary causal or consensual reasoning
128 Of course, if these legal concepts are composed of concepts that have ordinary
counterparts, then studying the lay view of those counterparts might prove useful. A
good example is the Hand Formula. Although most ordinary people do not speak about
or even know the Hand Formula, there may be useful experimental-jurisprudential work
in the study of its components (studying how ordinary people weigh burdens of prevention against probability and severity of harm). This reflects an important feature of Figure 1. The top row (reflecting that the legal concept has an ordinary counterpart) is a
useful heuristic for finding experimental-jurisprudential projects, but it is not a necessary requirement.
129 See infra Part III.
130 See generally Tobia, supra note 106.
131 See generally Macleod, supra note 115.
132 See generally, e.g., Sommers, supra note 107.
133 Id.
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rather than simply something about some more specific term
(e.g., “consent”).
III. EXPERIMENTAL JURISPRUDENCE: FIVE-AND-A-HALF MYTHS
This Part considers some popular claims about experimental jurisprudence, arguing that these are actually myths.134
Here, debunking each myth helps clarify the nature of experimental jurisprudence. Collectively, these explanations also justify XJur’s aims and methods.
The first half myth is the claim that XJur is new—an invention of the past five or ten years. That claim is misleading: experimental jurisprudence is not new. But there is a kernel of
truth in the myth. In recent years, the movement has grown
dramatically. Today, more scholars are conducting this research,
discussing a broader range of jurisprudential topics and using a
larger set of empirical methodologies.
The next five “full myths” reflect objections and challenges
to experimental jurisprudence. The first two claim that XJur is
misguided in its focus on laypeople rather than legal experts and
that it is focused on predicting the outcome of specific instances
of jury decision making. In fact, XJur has good reasons to study
laypeople—reasons that go beyond predicting the outcomes of
specific cases.
The next two myths are apparent truisms: Any given empirical data is either “experimental jurisprudential,” or it is not.
And any XJur scholarship must present original experiments.
Understanding why these are myths further clarifies the nature
and aims of experimental jurisprudence and its connection to
traditional jurisprudence.
These first four (and a half) myths provide the groundwork
for debunking the final myth: experimental jurisprudence is not
really jurisprudence. In fact, XJur is surprisingly consistent
with the aims and methods of traditional jurisprudence. Moreover, the questions and concerns of traditional jurisprudence call
for the modern experimental-jurisprudence approach. As such,
experimental jurisprudence should be understood as not merely
consistent with jurisprudence but a movement at its core.

134 This Section’s framework takes inspiration from John Gardner’s seminal piece
on legal positivism. See Gardner, supra note 52.
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A. The Half Myth: Experimental Jurisprudence Is New
Experimental jurisprudence is often described as new.135 If
this means that experimental jurisprudence is an invention of
the past decade, that’s not right. First, the name is not new. In
the 1930s, the term “experimental jurisprudence” described a
movement committed to sociological jurisprudence. Its practitioners were interested in uncovering facts and social behavior
related to law and testing the effects of laws with a “scientific
method.”136 That realism-inspired movement studied laws’ behavioral effects and tended to eschew formalistic study of legal
concepts.137 As such, the modern experimental jurisprudence—
committed to the earnest study of ordinary and legal concepts—
significantly diverges from the older one.
So, “experimental jurisprudence” refers to two movements
that share a commitment to legal empiricism (but little else).
Beyond this shared name, there is also a deeper sense in which
experimental jurisprudence is not new. Although there has been
an explosion of recent work in experimental jurisprudence,138
paradigmatic examples of the modern approach can be traced
back to at least the early twentieth century.
Contemporary experimental-jurisprudence research typically assigns lay participants to different treatments to assess
the effect of those treatments on people’s evaluations of questions related to legal theory. Studies of that type can be found in
the early twentieth century.139 And others followed: for example,
a 1955 study presented participants with different crimes (e.g.,
forgery, arson, bigamy) and different descriptions of the criminal’s social class (a “semiskilled worker,” “store manager,” or
“manager of a big manufacturing plant”) to assess lay judgments
of the seriousness of the offense under each class description.140

135 E.g., Knobe & Shapiro, supra note 116, at 165 (describing experimental jurisprudence as “a new way of doing legal theory”); Sommers, supra note 53, at 394 (“This new
approach departs from traditional law and psychology in both its scope and ambition.”).
136 Frederick K. Beutel, Some Implications of Experimental Jurisprudence, 48 HARV.
L. REV. 169, 170 (1934).
137 Id. at 169.
138 See supra Part II.
139 See generally, e.g., F.C. Sharp & M.C. Otto, A Study of the Popular Attitude Towards Retributive Punishment, 20 INT’L J. ETHICS 341 (1910) (assessing whether laypeople endorse a principle of retribution across different types of scenarios). I believe that I
first learned of this example from Thomas Nadelhoffer.
140 Arnold M. Rose & Arthur E. Prell, Does the Punishment Fit the Crime? A Study
in Social Valuation, 61 AM. J. SOCIO. 247, 251–52 (1955).
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Similar studies, concerning public perceptions of crime and
criminal behavior, appear throughout the twentieth century.141
The same is true of the broader field of experimental philosophy.142 The term “experimental philosophy” has taken other
meanings before its use in the modern movement.143 And, more
importantly, research before the twenty-first century likely
qualifies as “experimental philosophy,” understood in the modern sense. In the 1950s—long before the days of Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk)144—a group of Norwegian philosophers
remarked that “[w]hen philosophers offer conflicting answers to
questions that have empirical components, empirical research is
needed.”145 Those philosophers used various empirical methods,
including hypothesis-driven surveys. They also used corpuslinguistics-style analysis of philosophical terms’ usage in texts
(from newspapers to Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature).146
Pre-twenty-first-century research in other fields (e.g., experimental semantics) 147 also shares commonalities with experimental philosophy.
On a broader definition of “experimental philosophy,” the
origin is even earlier. Alberto Vanzo and Professor Peter Anstey
note that seventeenth-century philosophers distinguished between “experimental philosophy” and “speculative philosophy.”
The former is certainly different from today’s experimental philosophy. But there are striking similarities: both attempt to
141 See generally, e.g., Graeme R. Newman & Carol Trilling, Public Perceptions of
Criminal Behavior: A Review of the Literature, 2 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 217 (1975); David
M. Rafky & Ronald W. Sealey, The Adolescent and the Law: A Survey, 21 CRIME & DELINQ.
131 (1975) (studying intuitions about the law by varying prior contact with the law (arrested, never arrested) and race (white, black)).
142 E.g.,
Experimental Philosophy, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (2017),
https://perma.cc/SF7N-T8AV (“Experimental philosophy is a relatively new approach,
usually understood as beginning only in the early years of the 21st century.”). But see id.
(describing Socrates as an inspiration to the negative program).
143 See generally MARGARET CAVENDISH, OBSERVATIONS UPON EXPERIMENTAL PHILOSOPHY (Eileen O’Neill ed., 2001) (1666).
144 See infra note 215 and accompanying text.
145 ARNE NÆSS, INTERPRETATION AND PRECISENESS: A CONTRIBUTION TO THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATION, at VIII (1953). See also generally Arne Næss, “You Assert This?”:
An Empirical Study of Weight Expressions, in EMPIRICAL LOGIC AND PUBLIC DEBATE:
ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF ELSE M. BARTH 121 (Erik C.W. Krabbe et al. eds., 1993).
146 See generally Taylor Shaw Murphy, Experimental Philosophy: 1935-1965, in 1
OXFORD STUDIES IN EXPERIMENTAL PHILOSOPHY, supra note 58, at 325.
147 See generally Teenie Matlock & Bodo Winter, Experimental Semantics, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LINGUISTIC ANALYSIS (Bernd Heine & Heiko Narrog eds., 2015) (describing empirical research from the 1970s and 1980s concerning theoretical questions
about language).
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replace assumptions about philosophical systems with observational, empirical, or experimental foundations.148
The claim that today’s “experimental philosophy” traces to
the seventeenth century is controversial. But it is uncontroversial that experimental philosophy and experimental jurisprudence are not new in the past five years—or even in the twentyfirst century. Examples of experimental jurisprudence can be
traced to the 1910s.149 And central work in the modern field was
published almost thirty years ago. In 1995, Professors Paul Robinson and John Darley presented lay participants with different
scenarios designed to assess whether lay intuitions cohere with
criminal law. For example, participants considered different
types of intercourse scenarios—forceable intercourse between
strangers, dates, married persons, or homosexual persons—and
assessed whether the victim “consented,” whether the victim
“caused” the outcome, and whether the victim acted in a way
that was “morally inappropriate.”150
That experimental jurisprudence is new is the first myth.
But this is something of a half myth. Although examples of this
work existed long before this Article’s central examples, today’s
movement is growing quickly. Most earlier research in experimental jurisprudence focused on lay cognition of crime and criminal law concepts (e.g., causation, blame, punishment), but today’s
research frequently looks beyond criminal law concepts, including constitutional law, international law, torts, property, contracts, evidence, and legal interpretation.151

148

See generally EXPERIMENT, SPECULATION AND RELIGION IN EARLY MODERN PHI(Alberto Vanzo & Peter R. Anstey eds., 2019) (describing experimental philosophy, in contrast to “speculative philosophy,” in the seventeenth century); see also Peter
R. Anstey & Alberto Vanzo, Early Modern Experimental Philosophy, in A COMPANION TO
EXPERIMENTAL PHILOSOPHY 87, 98 (Justin Sytsma & Wesley Buckwalter eds., 2016):
LOSOPHY

[E]arly modern experimental philosophy is not a version of contemporary experimental philosophy. Rather, it is one of its historically distant relatives
within the family of movements that give pride of place to observation and experiment. There are two salient family resemblances, however. . . . First, . . . an
attempt to replace assumptions about . . . philosophical systems . . . with . . .
substantial observational and experimental foundations. . . . Second, old and
new experimental philosophers share similar attitudes towards speculative, a
priori reflections.
149

See generally, e.g., Sharp & Otto, supra note 139.
ROBINSON & DARLEY, supra note 54, at 163.
151 See supra Part II (discussing research on concepts related to torts, property, contracts, and legal interpretation).
150
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Moreover, technological developments allow more experimentaljurisprudence research and more sophisticated methods. It has
become possible to collect larger and more representative samples and to assess experimental-jurisprudential questions across
cultures and languages.152 Scholars are also increasingly relying
on methods beyond psychology surveys, such as corpus linguistics and new tools in natural-language processing.153
Finally, there is a new change in the sociology of experimental jurisprudence. Early work was largely categorized by legal theorists as psychology or sociology, but, today, experimentaljurisprudence studies are also conducted by legal philosophers.154
Moreover, discussion of that data is increasingly embedded
within legal-philosophical discourse: where the import of these
studies to philosophical inquiry was largely ignored, it is now at
least debated.155
Thus, the first myth is a half myth. Experimental jurisprudence is not new—but much of what is happening within experimental jurisprudence is.
B. Myth 1: Experimental Jurisprudence Should Study Legal
Experts, Not Laypeople
Now we turn to the full myths. The first is that experimental jurisprudence is misguided in its choice of population.
Jurisprudence is a field for legal experts, who have acquired legal knowledge. Yet experimental-jurisprudence usually surveys
lay populations with no legal expertise.156
Is XJur just young, dumb, and broke?157 Perhaps experimentalists have not yet realized the implications of relying on lay
populations and they have no access to expert ones. On this
152 See, e.g., Spamann et al., supra note 84, at 122–23. See generally Hannikainen et
al., supra note 84.
153 See generally, e.g., Nyarko & Sanga, supra note 72.
154 See generally, e.g., Knobe & Shapiro, supra note 116; Jiménez, supra note 49; Anthony Sebok, Beware of Strangers Bearing Gifts, J. THINGS THAT WE LIKE (LOTS) (Jan.
14, 2021), https://perma.cc/42M2-FLNY.
155 See generally, e.g., Jiménez, supra note 49; Sebok, supra note 154.
156 See, e.g., Jiménez, supra note 49 (arguing that experimental jurisprudence
should focus on judgments of legal officials, not laypeople); Sebok, supra note 154 (“This
paper suggests the better strategy is to ask better questions about what ordinary people
believe the law is. I doubt that this is going to prove [a] winning strategy, since, like so
much in life, what ordinary people believe underdetermines the hardest parts of most
human practices.”).
157 Cf. KHALID, Young Dumb & Broke, on AMERICAN TEEN (Right Hand Music Group
& RCA Records 2017).
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view, the best version of XJur would study only legal experts—
lawyers, judges, legislators, legal theorists—but, for now, these
populations are difficult and costly to access, so experimentalists
have settled for a cheaper alternative. However, this critique
misunderstands experimental jurisprudence. Most experimental
jurisprudence deliberately studies laypeople.
As an initial observation, consider that there are many
experimental-jurisprudence studies of only laypeople, but it is
much less common to find studies of only experts.158 When experimental jurisprudence does recruit expert populations, they are
often analyzed as comparisons to lay populations.159 And in studies
that recruit only legal experts, the results of experts are typically
analyzed in relation to prior studies about laypeople.160
The speculation that XJur recruits lay populations to reduce
cost (the “broke researcher” hypothesis) is inconsistent with
practice. It is cheaper to recruit a lay population than an expert
one, but studies of laypeople are not free. So why do experimental-jurisprudence projects that have successfully recruited
legal experts also recruit laypeople? The answer is that experimental jurisprudence is principally concerned with jurisprudential debates that are informed by facts about lay cognition.
Why might facts about lay cognition bear on jurisprudence?
Scholars have identified several reasons. One is that laypeople
engage with the law (and should engage with the law). As Sommers explains, laypeople serve in legal roles, such as deciders,
subjects, and victims.161 Laypeople serve on juries, they sign contracts, and they are affected by laws. If we seek understanding
of the legal concept of consent or reasonableness, part of our inquiry involves studying the potential jurors who apply those
concepts. We might also look to the laypeople who believe that
they are bound or protected by those concepts in contracts or
statutes. Insofar as theories of jurisprudence are partly concerned with what is happening “on the ground,” there is reason
to look to all the people who create and participate in that law.

158

But see generally, e.g., Guthrie et al., supra note 86.
E.g., Tobia, supra note 72, at 762.
160 See generally Guthrie et al., supra note 86 (drawing on dual-process theories of
ordinary judgment); Kneer & Bourgeois-Gironde, supra note 38 (studying judgments of
intent in a population of judges based on paradigms and prior results from studies on
laypeople, such as Knobe, supra note 38).
161 Sommers, supra note 107, at 2302–05.
159
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These concerns reflect another set of important theoretical
reasons: rule-of-law values. Theories of legal legitimacy claim
that law should be public (to laypeople and experts alike), that it
should provide fair notice, and that it should be applied consistently (as applied by lay juries or expert judges). As Macleod argues, these rule-of-law values play an important role in traditional jurisprudence: “Hart and Honoré, for example, appealed
to rule of law values” like publicity and fair notice in their jurisprudential analyses.162
Another justification comes from law’s democratic nature:
law should reflect ordinary judgments and concepts to allow citizens a line of democratic input into the legal system.163 This view
is most associated with certain democratic theories of criminal
law,164 but it might supply reasons more broadly. Insofar as
these democratic considerations are relevant, they would tend to
provide reasons in favor of using ordinary concepts—those accessible to the demos. If that’s right, we have to learn what—in
fact—those ordinary concepts are.
Consider two important versions of this expertise objection
from two very thoughtful, critical responses to XJur. The first is
from Professor Anthony Sebok.165 In a review essay, Sebok responds to a recent experimental-jurisprudence article that develops a theory of legal causation. The authors of that XJur
piece, Professors Joshua Knobe and Scott Shapiro, argue that
legal causation reflects the ordinary notion of causation (specifically, legal assessments of proximate cause in tort law reflect
ordinary causal judgment).166 To make their case, Knobe and
Shapiro draw on empirical research about ordinary causal
judgment, arguing that the ordinary concept of cause offers a surprisingly good explanation for the otherwise puzzling proximatecause caselaw.167
In the review, Sebok assesses the article’s jurisprudential
claims. For example, is it true that Knobe and Shapiro’s ordinary “conception of proximate cause . . . fits ‘patterns observed
162

Macleod, supra note 115, at 982.
See generally ROBINSON & DARLEY, supra note 45; Paul H. Robinson, Democratizing Criminal Law: Feasibility, Utility, and the Challenge of Social Change, 111 NW. U. L.
REV. 1565 (2017).
164 See generally Joshua Kleinfeld, Manifesto of Democratic Criminal Justice, 111
NW. U. L. REV. 1367 (2017); ROBINSON & DARLEY, supra note 54.
165 Sebok, supra note 154.
166 See generally Knobe & Shapiro, supra note 116.
167 Id. at 235.
163
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in legal judgments’?”168 In other words, is there actually a match
between the ordinary concept of causation and the legal concept?
And do Knobe and Shapiro correctly theorize the ordinary and
legal concepts? Sebok argues that the “match” claim is “not
wholly convincing.”169 As one example, Sebok argues that the legal concept of proximate cause reflects the “risk rule”: “An actor
is not subject to tort liability for causing an injury unless the
causal connection involves the realization of one of the risks that
renders the actor’s conduct tortious.”170
As an example of the risk rule, consider a very well-known
hypothetical: D negligently provides a loaded gun to a minor, M.
What risks render D’s conduct tortious? Perhaps the risk that M
might accidentally shoot someone. But suppose instead that M
drops the gun on P’s toe, breaking the toe. The risk rule explains
why D’s negligent conduct is not a proximate cause of P’s injury.
Toe-breaking (with the gun’s weight) is not a risk that renders
handing a gun to a minor tortious.
Sebok argues that Knobe and Shapiro’s more specific theory171 cannot accommodate this feature of legal causation. Whether or not that’s true, the important claim for our purposes is that
Sebok also seems to assume that the risk rule is not reflected in
the ordinary judgment of causation. That fact is taken to count
against Knobe and Shapiro’s claim that legal cause reflects ordinary cause. The ordinary concept (lacking the risk rule) does
not actually match the legal concept.
But it is not yet clear whether and why jurisprudence takes
that claim as a fact: Does the ordinary notion of cause fail to reflect the risk rule?172 This is a jurisprudential question and an
empirical one, and one that calls for study of laypeople’s assessments of causation. If the answer is yes, then that data counts in
favor of certain jurisprudential hypotheses (e.g., that the ordinary notion of cause differs from the legal one). If the answer is
no, then that counts in favor of other jurisprudential hypotheses
(e.g., that the ordinary notion of cause overlaps with the legal

168

Sebok, supra note 154.
Id.
170 Id.
171 This is a theory of causation and (ab)normality, which Knobe and Shapiro apply
in and out of law.
172 In some preliminary pilot studies, I have found that ordinary judgment of causation does not seem to reflect the risk rule.
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one and that perhaps the best way to understand both is
through Knobe and Shapiro’s abnormality account).
The Knobe-Shapiro–Sebok debate is framed as one about
experimental jurisprudence. But it is better understood as a debate within experimental jurisprudence. Each side is clearly engaging in jurisprudence. Specifically, the debate is about existing empirical work (about ordinary concepts) and what
jurisprudential claims the data support. The dialectic also contains implicit and explicit empirical claims, including claims
about which features characterize the ordinary concept of causation. There are various ways for participants in this debate to
make further jurisprudential progress. One of those ways would
be to conduct more empirical research about the ordinary concept of causation.
A second critique is from Professor Felipe Jiménez, who argues that “folk jurisprudence,” the experimental study of lay
concepts, is largely unhelpful as evidence in jurisprudential debates.173 According to Jiménez, jurisprudential conceptual analysis should reflect the intuitions and views of those who contribute to the content of law (such as judges and legislators—and
maybe even some scholars). Intuitions of other people might be
interesting for some sociological purposes, but they are not useful as data about jurisprudential questions.
This account has an intriguing implication for traditional
(nonexperimental)
jurisprudence.
Most
traditionaljurisprudence articles report the intuitions of their legalphilosopher authors. Yet most legal-philosopher authors are not
legal officials or contributors to the legal content of their jurisdiction. So Jiménez’s proposal suggests that today’s experimental jurisprudence is largely looking in the wrong place—but
so have decades of traditional jurisprudence. If jurisprudence
should be counting only the views of those who contribute content to the law, that banishes some laypeople but also many legal philosophers (it is not clear that it banishes all laypeople, insofar as some laypeople contribute legal content as jurors).
I agree with the broader thrust of Jiménez’s argument, but
my view is more pluralistic. In a legal system that governs diverse people and whose rules are articulated by lay jurors, judges, and legislators, it is not clear why jurisprudence should favor
any single group’s intuitions about what is legally consensual,
173

See Jiménez, supra note 49.
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intentional, or reasonable. But I would also extend the critique
to traditional jurisprudence; it is an especially strange tradition
to privilege the legal intuitions of those who attended five to
eight years of philosophy graduate school.
Reflecting on experimental jurisprudence may help provide
an answer. Somewhat ironically, insofar as legal philosophers
are not contributing content to the law, their conventional role
as privileged jurisprudential “intuiters” might be better understood through the lens of the ordinary (rather than the legal expert). The traditional legal philosopher does not have expertise
in the inner workings of the legislative process or courtroom
procedure. Rather, the traditional legal philosopher is expert in
drawing subtle conceptual distinctions and crafting clever test
cases and counterexamples. These skills are relevant to the
analysis of ordinary concepts. Similarly, traditional legal philosophers less often analyze unique legal concepts, such as forum
non conveniens. More often, they analyze legal concepts that
overlap with ordinary ones: cause, consent, intent, knowledge,
reasonableness, and so on.
This all suggests that traditional legal philosophers have
not aimed to stand in the shoes of legal technocrats as authorities on purely technical legal concepts. Rather, it seems, traditional legal philosophers have aimed to stand in the shoes of “us
all” as the authority on our concepts—of law, cause, intent, and
so on. That perspective (the “us all” perspective) is essential to
jurisprudence. Experimental jurisprudence does not propose to
banish the legal philosopher; it simply notes that the “us all”
perspective is enriched by, in fact, reflecting us all.
C. Myth 2: Experimental Jurisprudence Aims to Model Legal
Decision-Making
Experimental jurisprudence frequently points to the jury
and, in particular, jury instructions to demonstrate the empirical research’s implications.174 This might give the impression
that the research program is primarily focused on modeling that
type of decision-making. This is the next myth: experimental jurisprudence aims to model legal decision-making. On this view,
174 See, e.g., Sommers, supra note 107, at 2302 (“Implications for Jury Instructions”); Macleod supra note 115, at 982 (“[C]riminal and tort law’s extensive reliance on
juries provides further reason for courts to consider ordinary usage.”); Sommers, supra
note 53, at 395 (arguing that experimental jurisprudence illuminates “jury decision-making”);
Tobia, supra note 79, at 346 (describing practical implications for “jury instructions”).
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experimental-jurisprudence studies are, at their core, “mock jury” studies, aiming to help predict how a juror (or a judge) would
decide some specific case.
However, experimental jurisprudence does not generally
aim to model legal decision-making in the sense of predicting
the outcome of some specific case. To see this, consider that experimental jurisprudence is generally not very good at modeling
legal decision-making about a specific set of facts. As a point of
comparison, consider the very sophisticated branch of legal psychology that aims to model legal behavior and decision-making,
such as experimental studies of the behavioral effects of contract
provisions on jury decision-making.175 In those studies, experimentalists employ rich, multiparagraph vignettes with generous
background and legal context.176 To best model the decisionmaking of lay jurors, studies would provide important procedural details and example jury instructions.177
In contrast to those approaches, experimental jurisprudence
generally uses deliberately short and abstract scenarios, ones
that shed many of the complications of real legal decisionmaking contexts. Studies often use vignettes of just one paragraph178 or a series of short questions.179
Moreover, experimental jurisprudence typically studies lay
judgments arising in a deliberately nonlegal context. Surprisingly few XJur studies begin with the prompt, “Imagine that you
are a juror.” Nor are participants invited to deliberate with others,
as they might on a jury. In fact, participants are not always told
that they are evaluating a legal question. Rather, experimentaljurisprudence studies often provide participants with a story
about ordinary life, interrogating how the ordinary concept applies.
The idea that XJur focuses on modeling legal decisionmaking can lead to confusion. That is not its primary aim, and
to assume that it is creates the impression that experimental jurisprudence is some form of impoverished legal psychology. This
175

See generally Wilkinson-Ryan, supra note 75.
Id.
177 E.g., Shari Seidman Diamond, Illuminations and Shadows from Jury Simulations, 21 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 561, 563 (1997) (describing the complexity of jury simulations as compared to case summaries). See generally NEIL VIDMAR & VALERIE P. HANS,
AMERICAN JURIES: THE VERDICT (2007).
178 See generally, e.g., Kneer & Bourgeois-Gironde, supra note 38; Stich & Tobia, supra note 50.
179 See generally, e.g., Donelson & Hannekainen, supra note 58.
176
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impression also overshadows experimental jurisprudence’s true
aims. Because experimental jurisprudence is jurisprudence, it is
typically entering a more general and more theoretical conversation, not a specific and applied one. For example, in an experimental study of some concept, say reasonableness, the principal
experimental-jurisprudential goal is not to predict how jurors
will apply the New York jury instruction for negligence to a specific set of facts. Rather, the aim is to gain insight into the ordinary concept of reasonableness: How do we think about what is
reasonable? And should those features also characterize the legal concept?
Of course, XJur’s studies might contribute evidence to questions about jury decision-making. For example, insofar as a jury
instruction relies heavily on the term “reasonable,” data about
the lay concept of reasonableness may help us predict how jurors
will apply an instruction containing that term to specific facts.180
But there are various complexities of the real-world jury decision that most experimental jurisprudence studies simply do not
seek to address; how jurors will apply New York state negligence law to one specific set of facts is an important practical
question, but it is not one of legal philosophy.
As another example, consider experimental jurisprudence of
legal interpretation. For example, in An Experimental Guide to
Vehicles in the Park, Professors Noel Struchiner, Hannikainen,
and Guilherme Almeida find that lay participants rely on text
and purpose in the interpretation of rules.181 Those participants
received relatively short descriptions of rules in an effort to assess
the effects of text and purpose. Some other studies are even
more extreme.182 In Testing Ordinary Meaning, I studied how
laypeople, law students, and judges used dictionaries and legal
corpus-linguistics data to assess the ordinary meaning of terms
like “vehicle.”183 Participants received either very brief questions
(such as, “Is an airplane a vehicle?”) by themselves or a dictionary definition or a legal corpus-linguistics dataset followed by
very brief questions.184

180

Some experimental-jurisprudence pieces make this claim. E.g., Sommers, supra
note 107, at 2303; Tobia, supra note 79, at 346.
181 See generally Struchiner et al., supra note 72.
182 See Struchiner et al., supra note 72, at 315.
183 See generally Tobia, supra note 72.
184 Id. at 734.
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It would be a mistake to interpret these projects as precise
models of actual judging behavior. In the real world, there are
many other complicating factors. Judges can look through more
than one dictionary, reflect more thoroughly, speak to their
clerks, and consider the political valence of a case (which might
affect their use of the dictionary).185 These projects do not present themselves as models of how jurors or judges would likely
decide some particular case. Rather, they set out to address
broader jurisprudential questions, including: Do text and purpose both affect legal interpretation? And do dictionary definitions reliably measure ordinary meaning? To do this, the studies
employ abstract vignettes and materials.
Both types of questions are interesting and important. It is
useful to predict how judges will decide specific cases, and various empirical studies within the New Legal Realism focus on
that question.186 But the project of prediction is a different project from that of modern experimental jurisprudence. The other
type of question—for example, whether text and purpose both
inform interpretation—is a jurisprudential one, relevant to the
nature of legal interpretation.
D. Myth 3: Empirical Data Is Either Experimental
Jurisprudential or Not
Pick any experimental data—or even any empirical data.
Now consider the proposition that such data is either “experimental jurisprudential,” or it is not. This proposition seems like
it must be true.
However, this too is a myth. Whether a particular study or
finding falls within experimental jurisprudence depends on
more than the raw data itself. The very same set of empirical
data may be experimental jurisprudential in one context but not
another. The reason is that the same data might serve a number
of purposes, but data only becomes experimental jurisprudential
when it serves as evidence in jurisprudence. Understanding this
process—how empirical data can be transformed into experimental jurisprudence—clarifies the approach and how it differs
from other forms of empirical legal scholarship.
185 James J. Brudney & Lawrence Baum, Oasis or Mirage: The Supreme Court’s
Thirst for Dictionaries in the Rehnquist and Roberts Eras, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 483,
492–93 (2013).
186 See generally Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The New Legal Realism, 75
U. CHI. L. REV. 831 (2008).
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As an illustration, consider a common type of empirical finding. These are findings related to the so-called ordinary meaning
or plain meaning of legal texts.187 Empiricists conduct experiments to assess how ordinary people understand some term in a
legal text in an effort to provide evidence about the term’s ordinary meaning.
Recently, one important survey studied the ordinary meaning of the phrase “carries a firearm.”188 That survey was motivated by Muscarello v. United States,189 a case concerning a
criminal statute, in which the Supreme Court held that the ordinary meaning of the phrase “carries a firearm” includes conveying a gun in the locked glove compartment of a vehicle.190
The experimentalists provided survey participants with the
following scenario and question:
The law requires certain mandatory minimum penalties be
imposed on anyone who “during and in relation to any drug
trafficking crime, uses or carries a firearm.”
...
Suppose a person keeps a gun in the locked glove compartment of their car during a drug deal, just in case it was [ ]
ever needed, but doesn’t ever take it out.
How much do you agree with the following statement:
That person’s conduct qualifies for the mandatory minimum
penalties.191
Participants rated their agreement on a six-point scale, from
strongly disagree to strongly agree.192 Seventy-three percent of
participants agreed (“agree strongly,” “agree,” or “agree somewhat”), while 27% disagreed (“disagree strongly,” “disagree,” or
“disagree somewhat”).193 The authors interpret these results as
supporting the holding in Muscarello; the ordinary meaning of
“carrying a firearm” includes conveying a gun in the locked glove
compartment of a vehicle.194

187 E.g., Ben-Shahar & Strahilevitz, supra note 72, at 1765; Statutory Interpretation
from the Outside, supra note 72, at 262. See also generally Klapper et al., supra note 72;
Macleod, supra note 72; Macleod supra note 115.
188 See generally Klapper et al., supra note 72.
189 524 U.S. 125 (1998).
190 Id. at 139.
191 Klapper et al., supra note 72, at 26 (emphasis omitted).
192 Id. at 25.
193 Id. at 26.
194 Id.
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This is an interesting finding with important practical implications. For example, it could help us predict jury decisions in
future litigation. But this data is not in itself experimental jurisprudence. To be clear, this is in no way a criticism of that
study or its method. As it happens, that paper also presents a
second study and analysis that make an important contribution
within experimental jurisprudence.195
The reason that this finding is not experimental jurisprudential is not because it makes no contact with normative argument. In fact, the authors seem to endorse a normative argument and conclusion. Broadly speaking, the argument is: (1) If
most laypeople endorse this statement, Muscarello correctly determined the “ordinary meaning” of the language, and Muscarello should not have been decided differently; (2) most laypeople
endorse this statement; so (3) Muscarello correctly determined the
ordinary meaning and should not have been decided differently.
The reason that this data is not experimental jurisprudential is that the argument to which it is attached is not jurisprudential. There is no broader theoretical implication drawn from
the experimental finding. This finding is not taken to evince
something about the concept of ordinary meaning, the nature of
legal interpretation, or even the concept of carrying a firearm.
Here, the survey of laypeople plays a very different role; it functions as a calculator to compute the answer to the specific legal
dispute in Muscarello.
As a comparison, imagine a different piece of scholarship
analyzing Muscarello or another legal-interpretation dispute.
The scholar argues that the Court actually relied on the wrong
sources of interpretive evidence; rather than relying on these
dictionaries, the Court should have relied on those dictionaries.
And relying on those dictionaries would have changed the outcome. This is very different from jurisprudential scholarship
grappling with the meaning of legal justice or even “the problematics of interpreting legal texts.”196 Ordinary-meaning surveys can sometimes function as more straightforward applications of experimental methods to legal problems, more aptly
described as something like “ordinary meaning calculation.”
Given certain background assumptions about ordinary meaning,
new survey tools can help us compute the answer.197
195
196
197

Id.
POSNER, supra note 9, at xi.
See generally, e.g., Ben-Shahar & Strahilevitz, supra note 72.
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Although experimental jurisprudence often employs surveys, this type of applied surveying is not the paradigmatic form
of experimental jurisprudence. A misconception of XJur is that it
is the method of surveying laypeople to provide answers about
how law should be applied. This misconception is the product of
several myths. However, a survey of laypeople about some legal
topic is not necessarily experimental jurisprudence.
At the same time, a fascinating fact about many of these
surveys is that the data they collect might be transformed into
experimental-jurisprudential data. Recall the study that employed similar experimental survey questions about ordinary
terms, such as, “Is an airplane a vehicle?”198 The empirical finding is that yes, about 70% of people today say that an airplane is
a vehicle. That could be understood as ordinary-meaning calculation by, for example, helping us predict how future courts will
interpret contracts referring to vehicles. But that result was
elaborated in a very different way. For one, it was embedded
within a broader experimental framework. One group of participants answered those questions (Is a car a vehicle? Is a bicycle a
vehicle? and so on), another answered the same questions using
a dictionary, and the third used legal corpus linguistics.199 This
kind of broader experimental framework is usually a sign of experimental jurisprudence, as opposed to applied surveying.200
What makes XJur data “experimental jurisprudential” is
that there is a set of jurisprudential questions in the vicinity.
Here, the questions include: Do all these methods provide reliable evidence about “ordinary meaning”? And, if they diverge,
what does that imply about the concept of ordinary meaning, the
prospects of textualist and originalist theories, and the nature of
interpretation? The study did find some dramatic divergence
among those methods, which supports jurisprudential implications about all these questions.
The point is that this type of data—for example, what do ordinary people think that law X means—is not necessarily itself
experimental jurisprudential. But it could be. To become experimental jurisprudential, the research must bring the data to

198

See generally Tobia, supra note 72; see also Struchiner et al. supra note 63.
Tobia, supra note 72, at 734.
200 But it is not sufficient. For example, here, all of that data might be understood in
a merely applied way: We now have more methods (surveys, dictionary use, corpuslinguistics use) to predict some specific court determinations of ordinary meaning or assess
some past determinations.
199
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bear on jurisprudential questions. Often, that aim is reflected in
the experimental design. But sometimes not. There may be some
datasets that were not collected with jurisprudential aims in
mind but nevertheless have important jurisprudential implications. The very same data could either be experimental jurisprudence—or not.
The same is true of all experimental-jurisprudence studies.
Each study could be taken to address only narrow, applied
questions:
• What do most people believe is the reasonable number of days to return a product ordered online when
there is no warranty?201
• What do most people say about the key question in
Burrage v. United States202 (a case concerning liability under the Controlled Substances Act)?203 Did
death “result from” the drug sold?204
• Do most people judge that a given instance of sex-bydeception is consensual?205
Any of those findings could be taken in a (merely) applied way,
helping us predict how juries might decide this case or evaluate
whether that case was decided correctly.
What makes papers experimental jurisprudence is that they
develop and grapple with jurisprudential implications of data.
Often, the data are analyzed to provide evidence about ordinary
and legal concepts—not just evidence about how some particular
case was or should be decided. And the papers raise jurisprudential questions, such as: Should this feature of the ordinary
concept (that the experiment has discovered) be reflected in the
legal criteria? For example, now that we learn that sex-bydeception is compatible with the ordinary notion of consent,
should the legal criteria of consent be compatible with sex-bydeception? And does our new understanding of why the ordinary
notion of consent may reflect this feature enrich jurisprudential
debate about the legal criteria?206
The examination of this myth might seem somewhat pedantic. Is this merely a terminological debate over what we call

201
202
203
204
205
206

See generally Tobia, supra note 72.
571 U.S. 204 (2014).
Id. at 206.
See generally Macleod, supra note 115.
See generally Sommers, supra note 107.
Id.
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“experimental jurisprudence” and what we call something
else?207 But this categorization is significant: If something is experimental jurisprudence, then it is jurisprudence,208 and that
categorization matters. Insofar as jurisprudence seeks the truth
about its theoretical questions, it is worthwhile to correctly identify what is—and what should be—part of that discussion.
If some set of data could become experimental jurisprudence, that data is a kind of “suspended jurisprudence.” Understanding XJur in this way makes clear that legal philosophers
should attend to data which have not yet been crystalized in
writing as experimental jurisprudence. The next Section takes
up this theme.
E. Myth 4: Experimental Jurisprudence Requires Conducting
Experiments
This is a myth for two reasons. First, “experimental” jurisprudence is a slight misnomer. The better name would be “empirical jurisprudence,” as the movement should include the work
of scholars who evaluate nonexperimental empirical data in the
service of jurisprudence. For example, scholars have used (empirical, not experimental) corpus-linguistics methods to study
the ordinary concept of causation and questions in legal interpretation.209 As XJur emerges, the big-data-and-law movement
also grows.210 Some of those projects have jurisprudential aims
or potential. This Article’s considerations about experimental jurisprudence also apply to empirical jurisprudence.
If that were the whole problem with this myth, it would become a true statement with one modification: experimental jurisprudence requires conducting empirical studies. Yet that too
is a myth. Even if XJur does not require running experiments, it
seems like it must at least require some empirical study or data
collection. However, XJur does not always proceed in this way.
207 Maybe, but the practice of defining new legal-scholarship approaches is a shared
and important one. See generally, e.g., Jedediah Britton-Purdy, David Singh Grewal,
Amy Kapczynksi & K. Sabeel Rahman, Building a Law-and-Political-Economy Framework: Beyond the Twentieth-Century Synthesis, 129 YALE L.J. 1784 (2020); Robert Alexy,
The Nature of Legal Philosophy, 17 RATIO JURIS 156 (2004); ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS
ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS (6th ed. 2016).
208 See infra Part III.F.
209 See generally, e.g., Sytsma et al., supra note 90.
210 See generally LAW AS DATA: COMPUTATION, TEXT & THE FUTURE OF LEGAL
ANALYSIS (Michael A. Livermore & Daniel N. Rockmore eds., 2019); Nyarko & Sanga,
supra note 72.

2022]

Experimental Jurisprudence

779

For example, consider Proximate Cause Explained: An Essay in Experimental Jurisprudence.211 Despite that article’s selfcategorization as experimental jurisprudence, readers might be
surprised to find that it does not report new experimental data.
It is coauthored by one of the founders of modern experimental
philosophy and by the modern coiner of the phrase “experimental jurisprudence,” and they are undoubtedly right to categorize their project as experimental jurisprudence. But the
work presents no new experiments. So what, exactly, makes it
experimental jurisprudence?
The answer is that experimental jurisprudence requires data, not data creation. And authoring experimental jurisprudence
requires the interrogation of data in service of a jurisprudential
inquiry, not the collection of that data. Moreover, whoever originally collected the data need not have intended that it would ultimately play some role in experimental jurisprudence.
This last point carries an intriguing implication. If experimentaljurisprudence data need not be collected as experimentaljurisprudence data, it is possible that much of that data already
exists. These would be extant data with untapped potential, ripe
for jurisprudential analysis. One area full of such studies is the
cognitive science of ordinary concepts. An important branch of
experimental jurisprudence could analyze these established empirical results from a jurisprudential perspective by asking, for
example, what these findings about ordinary concepts suggest
about the legal concepts.212
The Knobe and Shapiro article described above is a model of
this kind of XJur.213 There is a wealth of extant experimental data about the ordinary concept of causation. The authors analyzed this data with jurisprudential questions in mind, resulting
in an important experimental-jurisprudential contribution—
even without running any new experiments.
At first, it seems paradoxical that experimental jurisprudence does not require experimentation. But XJur takes jurisprudential questions and addresses them with empirical data
(usually experiments). One way to participate is to conduct a
new empirical study and evaluate its jurisprudential implications,

211

See generally Knobe & Shapiro, supra note 116.
See generally, e.g., Kobick & Knobe, supra note 101; Kobick, supra note 101.
213 See generally Knobe & Shapiro, supra note 116; Limiting Identity, supra note 63;
Macleod, supra note 92.
212
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but another way to participate is to interrogate the jurisprudential import of extant empirical studies.
F.

Myth 5: Experimental Jurisprudence is Not Really
Jurisprudence

The boundaries of jurisprudence are debated, 214 but the
term calls to mind a certain picture. That standard picture
seems to diverge sharply from the standard picture of experimental jurisprudence.
• The image of jurisprudence: A group of learned legal
experts debate law’s deepest theoretical questions in
an effort to determine what law should be.
• The image of experimental jurisprudence: Some
punk takes a longstanding jurisprudential question
about what law should be and claims to settle it by
asking laypeople on online platforms like MTurk.215
How can this latter approach possibly be part of jurisprudence?
Debunking the previous myths lays the groundwork to understand the flaw in this image of experimental jurisprudence.
Experimental jurisprudence does not recommend “mock juries
for jurisprudence,” seeking to settle jurisprudential questions
with polling—of laypeople or experts (Myth 2). Rather, it grapples
with fundamentally jurisprudential questions, typically those
making claims about ordinary cognition (Myths 2 and 3), and interrogates them with empirical data that is well suited to addressing those questions (Myth 4).
Given debate about the meaning of jurisprudence, it can be
difficult to prove that any project falls within it. But recall some
of those common characterizations. Jurisprudence is “mostly
synonymous with ‘philosophy of law’ [and also] the elucidation of
214

See supra notes 4–8 and accompanying text.
MTurk is a platform commonly used in experimental-jurisprudence studies. See,
e.g., Adam J. Berinsky, Gregory A. Huber & Gabriel S. Lenz, Evaluating Online Labor
Markets for Experimental Research: Amazon.com’s Mechanical Turk, 20 POL. ANALYSIS
351, 366 (2012); Gabriele Paolacci, Jesse Chandler & Panagiotis G. Ipeirotis, Running
Experiments on Amazon Mechanical Turk, 5 JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 411, 412–
13 (2010); see also Michael Buhrmester, Tracy Kwang & Samuel D. Gosling, Amazon’s
Mechanical Turk: A New Source of Inexpensive, Yet High-Quality, Data?, 6 PERSP. ON
PSYCH. SCI. 3, 5 (2011). There are some critiques of MTurk. See, e.g., Gabriele Paolacci &
Jesse Chandler, Inside the Turk: Understanding Mechanical Turk as a Participant Pool,
23 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCH. SCI. 184, 187 (2014); Richard N. Landers & Tara S.
Behrend, An Inconvenient Truth: Arbitrary Distinctions Between Organizational, Mechanical Turk, and Other Convenience Samples, 8 INDUS. & ORGANIZATIONAL PSYCH.
142, 152–53 (2015).
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legal concepts and normative theory from within the discipline
of law.”216 Jurisprudence studies problems like “the meaning of
legal justice . . . and the problematics of interpreting legal
texts,”217 and the “essence of the subject . . . involves the analysis
of general legal concepts.”218
Experimental jurisprudence is not merely consistent with
these aims of traditional jurisprudence; it is actually at the core
of traditional jurisprudence. Jurisprudence has long included
the interrogation of ordinary notions corresponding to legal concepts: What are the ordinary notions of cause, consent, intent,
knowledge, recklessness, and reasonableness? Traditional jurisprudence notes that these facts about the ordinary notion should
inform both descriptive and normative discussions about what
legal criteria are and should be.
As a final example, consider a passage from Professors Antony Honoré and John Gardner’s introduction to a handbook entry on “Causation in the Law”:
The basic questions dealt with in this entry are: (i) whether
and to what extent causation in legal contexts differs from
causation outside the law, for example in science or everyday life, and (ii) what are the appropriate criteria in law for
deciding whether one action or event has caused another.219
This description identifies two of the most important questions
of jurisprudence:
(i) What is the relationship between ordinary and legal concepts? In this example, is the legal concept of causation different from the ordinary one?
(ii) What are the criteria of legal concepts? In this example,
what is the appropriate criterion for deciding when something is a legal cause?
These are examples of two of the most central jurisprudential questions from two of the most central figures in modern
analytical jurisprudence. Part II’s examples of experimental jurisprudence provide direct evidence about question (i) and grap-
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See generally Solum, supra note 8.
POSNER, supra note 9, at xi.
218 Tur, supra note 7, at 152.
219 Antony Honoré & John Gardner, Causation in the Law, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA
PHIL. ARCHIVE (Nov. 17, 2010), https://perma.cc/CN6Q-DZ7G.
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ple seriously with question (ii) on the basis of those empirical
discoveries.
Sometimes, there is skepticism about what experimental
studies of ordinary people can contribute to debates about legal
concepts. But I agree with Honoré and Gardner: many central
jurisprudential questions, like their question (i) about causation,
are both jurisprudential and empirical. To best interrogate that
question requires studying both ordinary and legal concepts—
looking to the law as well as facts from everyday life. It would be
a mistake to focus exclusively on ordinary life, language, and
concepts, but it would be an equally large mistake to ignore
them.
Traditional jurisprudence is replete with claims and questions that are simultaneously jurisprudential and empirical. As
such, XJur is not mistakenly replacing jurisprudence with social
science. Rather, XJur is responding to traditional jurisprudence’s call for empirical data, contributing new insights within
an entirely traditional jurisprudential conversation. Jurisprudence may be a broad church,220 but if questions like (i) and (ii)
are at its core, scholars should shepherd empirical methods from
the balcony to the pulpit.
IV. APPLICATIONS
The preceding Parts have introduced experimental jurisprudence, summarized its projects, and debunked central misconceptions about it. In doing so, this Article has also articulated several broad justifications for the approach, including that
experimental jurisprudence can assess intuitions and other empirical claims made by legal theories and raise new challenges to
those theories,221 clarify the relationship between ordinary and
legal concepts,222 and identify new jurisprudential questions and
possibilities.223
This Part turns to two more concrete applications, identifying areas in which further XJur work might be particularly useful.
220

Dickson, supra note 11, at 209.
See, e.g., supra Part III.D (summarizing a study that suggests that different
sources of evidence of ordinary meaning provide systematically different verdicts, raising
questions about some theories’ conceptions of ordinary meaning).
222 See supra Parts II.A.2, II.A.3 (summarizing studies that have discovered previously
unknown features of the ordinary concepts of consent and cause, raising new theoretical
questions about the relationship between those concepts and their legal counterparts).
223 See infra note 303 and accompanying text (summarizing a study on reasonableness that provided evidence of a “hybrid” ordinary concept of reasonableness).
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The first application concerns the rise of ordinary meaning in
legal interpretation, particularly in originalist and textualist legal theory. The second concerns the New Private Law. These
serve as a useful pair of illustrations: one associated with public
law, one with private law; one focused on interpretation of legal
texts, one participating in a broader common law tradition; one
debated frequently in the courts, one debated largely in legaltheory circles; but both of tremendous jurisprudential impact
and importance. The closer study of these two areas reveals important and diverse ways in which experimental jurisprudence
offers unique insights into the most important modern jurisprudential debates.
A. Ordinary Meaning
One of the most significant trends in legal theory—and
practice—is the growing importance of ordinary meaning in interpretation.224 When interpreting legal texts, scholars and
courts look to the ordinary meaning or original public meaning
of the language.225 This approach is strongly associated with textualist and originalist theories of statutory226 and constitutional
interpretation,227 but ordinary meaning also plays a significant
role within a broad range of other interpretive theories228 and in
the interpretation of other legal texts, including contracts229 and
treaties.230
Ordinary meaning’s significance varies across legal theories.
For example, new textualist theories typically understand a
text’s communicative content to constrain interpretation and ordinary meaning as a central determinant of communicative content.231 Pluralistic theories might treat ordinary meaning as one

224

See BRIAN G. SLOCUM, ORDINARY MEANING: A THEORY OF THE MOST FUNDAMEN-

TAL PRINCIPLE OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION 4 (2015).
225

See generally Lawrence B. Solum, The Constraint Principle: Original Meaning
and Constitutional Practice (Apr. 3, 2019) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). See also Victoria Nourse, Textualism 3.0: Statutory Interpretation After Justice
Scalia, 70 ALA. L. REV. 667, 681 (2019).
226 See generally Nourse, supra note 225.
227 See generally Solum, supra note 225.
228 See generally, e.g., SLOCUM, supra note 224; Tobia, supra note 72.
229 See generally, e.g., Stephen C. Mouritsen, Contract Interpretation with Corpus
Linguistics, 94 WASH. L. REV. 1337 (2019).
230 See generally, e.g., Brian G. Slocum & Jarrod Wong, The Vienna Convention and
the Ordinary Meaning of International Law, 46 YALE J. INT’L L. 191 (2021).
231 See generally, e.g., Solum, supra note 225.
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of several interpretive considerations alongside intent, purpose,
and even the consequences of a given interpretation.
There are debates about what role ordinary meaning should
play in interpretation and what exactly “ordinary meaning”
means.232 But many agree that ordinary meaning is closely connected to empirical facts about how ordinary people understand
language.233 That is, a legal text’s ordinary meaning is not necessarily the meaning that its drafters intended it to have or the
meaning that would allow the text to achieve the best results.
Rather, investigation into a text’s ordinary meaning is an investigation into facts about how ordinary people would actually understand the language.
The empirical aspect of ordinary meaning can be traced to
the most common justifications for an ordinary-meaning interpretive criterion. There is, of course, great debate about whether
and why ordinary meaning should be a legal-interpretive constraint or consideration. But one of the most common justifications invokes rule-of-law values.
These rule-of-law values took center stage in the recent case
Bostock v. Clayton County,234 a landmark decision protecting gay
and transgender persons from employment discrimination under
Title VII.235 Justice Neil Gorsuch’s majority opinion was grounded in a textualist analysis of ordinary meaning, holding that
Title VII’s prohibition against adverse employment actions taken “because of . . . [an individual’s] sex” prohibits adverse employment actions taken against persons for being gay or
transgender.236 Consider Justice Gorsuch’s discussion of ordinary
public meaning:
This Court normally interprets a statute in accord with the
ordinary public meaning of its terms at the time of its enactment. After all, only the words on the page constitute the
law adopted by Congress and approved by the President. If
judges could add to, remodel, update, or detract from old
232

See generally, e.g., Fallon, supra note 6.
See generally, e.g., Tobia, supra note 72; see also Randy E. Barnett, Interpretation
and Construction, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 65, 66 (2011) (“It cannot be overstressed
that the activity of determining semantic meaning at the time of enactment required by
the first proposition is empirical, not normative.” (emphasis in original) (citing KEITH E.
WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT
AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 6 (1999))).
234 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020).
235 See generally id.
236 Id. at 1745.
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statutory terms inspired only by extratextual sources and
our own imaginations, we would risk amending statutes
outside the legislative process reserved for the people’s representatives. And we would deny the people the right to
continue relying on the original meaning of the law they
have counted on to settle their rights and obligations.237
Here, Justice Gorsuch appeals to ordinary meaning as an
interpretive criterion that promotes the values of notice and
reliance. Interpreting a legal text in line with its ordinary
meaning helps ensure that ordinary people can rely on law. Importantly, these rule-of-law justifications reinforce the significance of understanding ordinary meaning empirically. There are
facts about what ordinary people would take from statutory language, and interpretation grounded in reliance and fair notice
should concern itself with how ordinary people would in fact rely
upon or be notified by the legal text.
These rule-of-law justifications are shared among other textualist judges. Consider Justice Brett Kavanaugh’s Bostock dissent: “Judges adhere to ordinary meaning for two main reasons:
rule of law and democratic accountability.”238
However, a shared commitment to ordinary meaning does
not necessarily resolve all interpretive debate.239 In Bostock, Justices Gorsuch and Kavanaugh both interpreted Title VII in line
with what they considered to be its ordinary meaning, but Justice Gorsuch wrote for the majority and Justice Kavanaugh in
dissent. That disagreement is the subject of scholarly debate.240
This Section does not propose a resolution to that debate, but it
does use the Bostock scholarship as an illustration of what
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Id. at 1738.
Id. at 1825 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
239 See generally, e.g., Tara Leigh Grove, Comment, Which Textualism?, 134 HARV.
L. REV. 265 (2020); Victoria Nourse & William N. Eskridge, Textual Gerrymandering;
The Eclipse of Republican Government in an Era of Statutory Populism, 96 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1718 (2021).
240 See generally, e.g., Robin Dembroff, Issa Kohler-Hausmann & Elise Sugarman,
What Taylor Swift and Beyoncé Teach Us About Sex and Causes, 169 U. PA. L. REV.
ONLINE 1 (2020); Anuj Desei, Text Is Not Enough, 93 U. COLO. L. REV. 1 (2022); Benjamin Eidelson, Dimensional Disparate Treatment, 95 S. CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2022);
William N. Eskridge Jr., Brian G. Slocum & Stefan Th. Gries, The Meaning of Sex: Dynamic Words, Novel Applications, and Original Public Meaning, 119 MICH. L. REV. 1503
(2021); Grove, supra note 239; Andrew Koppelman, Bostock, LGBT Discrimination, and the
Subtractive Moves, 105 MINN. L. REV. HEADNOTES 1 (2020); Macleod, supra note 72; Kevin
Tobia & John Mikhail, Two Types of Empirical Textualism, 86 BROOK. L. REV. 461 (2021).
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experimental jurisprudence can contribute to jurisprudential
study of ordinary meaning.
The key interpretive question in Bostock concerned the language of Title VII, which prohibits adverse employment actions
taken “because of . . . [an] individual’s race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin.”241 One plaintiff employee was fired for being
gay, another for being transgender. So Bostock’s interpretive
question was whether each gay and transgender employee was
fired “because of . . . [that individual’s] sex.”242
Justice Gorsuch’s majority opinion held that yes, each employee was fired “because of sex.”243 The reasoning turned on the
interpretation of “because of.” Justice Gorsuch reasoned that the
ordinary meaning of Title VII’s “because of” language reflects a
but-for test:
“[T]he ordinary meaning of ‘because of’ is ‘by reason of’ or
‘on account of.’” In the language of law, this means that
Title VII’s “because of” test incorporates the simple and
“traditional” standard of but-for causation. That form of
causation is established whenever a particular outcome
would not have happened “but for” the purported cause. In
other words, a but-for test directs us to change one thing at
a time and see if the outcome changes. If it does, we have
found a but-for cause.244
According to Justice Gorsuch, an intuitive application of this
test suggests that the gay and transgender employees were fired
“because of” their sexes. Consider, for example, a transgender
woman employee: a person assigned a male sex at birth245 who
identifies as a woman. An antitransgender employer fires her.
Now, “change one thing at a time and see if the outcome
changes.”246 Suppose that the employee was instead assigned a
female sex at birth and (still) identified as a woman. In this
case, the antitransgender employer would not fire her. The antitransgender firing turns entirely on the employee’s sex; that is,
the employee’s sex was a but-for cause of the firing. Thus, firing
241

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
Bostock, 140 S. Ct at 1739.
243 Id. at 1741.
244 Id. at 1739 (citations omitted) (quoting Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar,
570 U.S. 338, 350 (2013)).
245 The Bostock opinions—majority and dissenting—characterize sex as “biological
sex.” See id. at 1739.
246 Id.
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an individual for being transgender is to fire them “because
of” sex.247
Justices Kavanaugh and Samuel Alito wrote separate dissenting opinions. Each agreed with Justice Gorsuch’s starting point—a textualist inquiry into the ordinary meaning
of Title VII248—but disagreed with details of the analysis. Specifically, both Justices Kavanaugh and Alito suggested that the
ordinary meaning of Title VII does not prohibit firing a gay or
transgender employee. As Justice Alito put it:
Suppose that, while Title VII was under consideration in
Congress, a group of average Americans decided to read the
text of the bill with the aim of writing or calling their representatives in Congress and conveying their approval or disapproval. What would these ordinary citizens have taken
“discrimination because of sex” to mean? Would they have
thought that this language prohibited discrimination because of sexual orientation or gender identity?249
Justice Alito assumes that the answer is no. Ordinary citizens would not understand antigay or antitransgender employment actions to be ones taken “because of [the individual
employee’s] sex.” 250
There are tremendous similarities between the majority and
the dissents. All are committed to ordinary meaning, and all justify that approach via rule-of-law values like fair notice and publicity. All are also committed to an empirical conception of ordinary meaning. For each Justice, the key question is what
ordinary people would actually understand.
Now, one could proceed by intuition alone, making the best
guess about what most ordinary people would say. But those
working in experimental jurisprudence have begun to address
these empirical questions about ordinary meaning with empirical
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Id. at 1741.
See id. at 1755 (Alito, J., dissenting); id. at 1824 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
249 Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1767 (Alito, J., dissenting). Here, Justice Alito’s remarks
are ambiguous between referencing the original public meaning and the public’s original
expected applications. Most new originalists and new textualists are concerned with
original public meaning, which is not limited to original expected applications. As such,
this Section interprets Justice Alito’s opinion in line with the (more common) modern
theory focused on public meaning.
250 Id.
248
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studies. For example, Macleod has studied how ordinary people
today understand language like “because of.”251
One of Macleod’s more recent studies provided participants
with the very question in Bostock.252 Participants received a series of questions concerning antigay and antitransgender employers who fired gay or transgender employees. The survey
asked: Was the employee fired “because of his sex?”253 Macleod
found that the majority of participants actually agreed in both
cases that firing the gay and transgender employee was firing
them because of their sex.254
That experiment tests the empirical question raised by Justices Kavanaugh and Alito. Those dissenting opinions suggested
that the answer was no—that ordinary people did not understand the language that way, certainly not in 1964 and probably
not today.255 Justice Kavanaugh’s dissent notes that there is
likely no difference in the ordinary meaning of Title VII between
1964 and today.256 Macleod’s survey suggests that here, the Justices’ individual intuitions may not be a perfect guide to ordinary meaning.
A second experimental study provides further support to rebut the empirical assumptions of Justices Kavanaugh and
Alito.257 That second study presented participants with similar
scenarios to those used in Macleod’s study. It also included two
other hypotheticals with a similar structure: Is someone fired for
being in an interracial marriage fired “because of his race”? And
is someone fired for being pregnant fired “because of her sex”?
The sexual-orientation scenario began:
Mike was an employee at an Italian restaurant. Mike had
worked there for ten years. Mike was a gay man, who was
married to another man. One day, Mike’s boss learned that
Mike is gay. Two days later, Mike’s boss fired him, saying
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See generally Macleod, supra note 115.
See generally Macleod, supra note 72.
253 Id. at 19–28.
254 Id.
255 The originalist aspect of this interpretation problem raises many more interesting issues, which cannot be addressed here. It is worth noting, however, that some scholarship actually suggests the opposite: “sex” may have had a broader meaning in 1964
than today. See Eskridge et al., supra note 240.
256 Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1825 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
257 See generally Tobia & Mikhail, supra note 240.
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“I’m sorry Mike, I just don’t think having gay employees is
good for business.”258
In one version, participants were presented with a question that
mimicked Justices Alito and Kavanaugh’s approach. The question for the sexual-orientation case was: “Statement: Mike was
fired because of his sex. [Yes or No].”259 This question also clarified that “sex” referred only to “biological sex.”260
The study replicated Macleod’s findings. The majority of
participants endorsed that antigay and antitransgender firings
were because of sex.261 However, results were more mixed for the
other cases. The majority endorsed that anti-interracial marriage and antipregnancy firings were not “because of” race and
sex, respectively.262
That study also presented other participants with a case following Justice Gorsuch’s framing. Do ordinary people agree that
sex is a but-for cause of antigay and antitransgender firings?
The sexual-orientation scenario under that framework concluded instead with this question:
“Imagine that the above scenario were different in exactly
one way: Mike was not a man but was instead a woman named
‘Michelle,’ who is married to a man. Imagine that everything
else about the scenario was the same. Would Michelle still have
been fired? [Yes or No].”
Here, participants were overall more inclined to find Title VII
discrimination. Across all four cases (sexual orientation,
transgender, interracial marriage, and pregnancy), the majority
of participants chose no, implicitly identifying the Title VII factor (sex or race) as a but-for cause.263
The details of that experiment to illustrate that one function
of experiments is to help evaluate empirical claims implicit in
legal theory. The experimental evidence supports Justice Gorsuch’s
258
259
260

Id. at 476.
Id. at 478.
Id. at 476 n.74:

Please read the scenario and tell us whether you agree (“yes”) or disagree
(“no”) with the following statement. For the purpose of this question, “sex”
should be understood to mean biological sex, per Merriam-Webster’s dictionary: “either of the two major forms of individuals that occur in many species
and that are distinguished respectively as female or male especially on the basis
of their reproductive organs and structures.”
261
262
263

Id. at 480.
Tobia & Mikhail, supra note 240, at 280.
Id.

790

The University of Chicago Law Review

[89:3

assumption: ordinary people understand sex as a but-for cause
of sexual-orientation discrimination. The evidence does not so
strongly support Justices Kavanaugh and Alito’s assumptions:
ordinary people do not agree that antigay and antitransgender
firings are not firings “because of [the individual’s] sex.”
However, the studies offer something beyond this contribution. They help clarify a broader jurisprudential point. For example, the authors of the second experimental study argued
that these empirical results support the significance of “a distinction between two types of empirical textualism.”264 One is
“ordinary criteria” textualism, which is reflected in Justice
Kavanaugh and Justice Alito’s approach to Bostock. That view
equates ordinary meaning with ordinary understanding. However, as the experiments suggest, the ordinary understanding of
Title VII’s language may differ from what Justice Kavanaugh
and Justice Alito assume. But Justice Gorsuch’s textualism in
Bostock reflects a different theory, “legal criteria textualism.” On
that view, textualism combines ordinary understanding of statutory terms “with both their previously-established legal meanings and their legal entailments.”265 This is simply a different
type of “empirical textualism.” And it is one supported by empirical evidence: Justice Gorsuch’s assumption about ordinary people’s application of a but-for test is supported by the data.
This distinction—between ordinary- and legal-criteria textualism—is a possibility that could be contemplated and elaborated from the armchair, without empirical evidence. But experimental work helps crystallize the significance of the distinction.
Ordinary-criteria textualism and legal-criteria textualism are
both theories committed to ordinary meaning in legal interpretation, and both make empirical claims about ordinary people’s
understanding. It is (in theory) possible that these theories could
lead to divergent results. And in the Bostock case, the two approaches do diverge. That divergence is best illuminated by empirical data.266
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Id. at 486.
Id.
266 Specifically, the empirical data suggest that both approaches favor the plaintiffs
in Bostock. However, the two approaches are not equivalent. For example, Justice Gorsuch’s legal-criteria textualism more strongly supports the gay employee. Both approaches strongly support the transgender employee. Id. But see Mitchell N. Berman &
Guha Krishnamurthi, Bostock Was Bogus: Textualism, Pluralism, and Title VII, 97
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This legal-theory distinction, supported by experimental
study, is also one that could inform broader jurisprudential debates. Recall that textualists often appeal to fair notice and reliance as justifications for an ordinary-meaning approach to interpretation. By demonstrating the possible divergence of
ordinary-criteria and legal-criteria textualism, the experimental
study can also be seen as one that raises the question about the
concept of publicity and other rule-of-law values.
Specifically, does publicity (as a rule-of-law value) require
that law reflect ordinary people’s understanding of the language
in the text? Or does publicity require that legal criteria are applied consistently with ordinary people’s understanding of the
application of those criteria? Experimental study itself provides
no answer to this question, but it helps articulate it.
Surveys are a very attractive tool in ordinary-meaning debates. As courts and commentators continue to interrogate the
ordinary meanings of legal texts, it may become even more
tempting to outsource legal interpretation to surveys. But experimental jurisprudence avoids such an incautious use of surveys.
Experiments will not tell us in simple terms what the law
should be. But they can provide insight into the truth of empirical claims made by legal theories. Moreover, experimental
methods can make jurisprudential contributions, calling attention to new theoretical distinctions of practical and jurisprudential significance.
B. The New Private Law
Like the rise of ordinary meaning, the New Private Law is
an influential and impressive movement in modern legal theory.267 A central theme of the New Private Law is the rejection of
reductive, purely instrumental accounts of private law. Professor John Goldberg articulates this vision—a private-law theory
that chooses:
[T]o stick close to everyday practices and to be wary of concepts, categories, or methods that claim for themselves a
certain kind of essential validity or primacy. . . . [This view]
supposes that reality is complex and that it will not advance
the cause of knowledge to assume that one comes to understand reality by stripping away superstructure to get to

267
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base. . . . [It] calls for a patient exploration of the many facets
of a phenomenon or problem.268
Some might see experimental jurisprudence as a reductive
force, one in opposition to this vision of the New Private Law.
According to that view, experimentalists simply use surveys to
compute answers to private-law-theory questions.269 Part III argued that this picture is a caricature.270 Experimental jurisprudence does not typically endorse such reductive analysis. To the
contrary, XJur work shares the New Private Law’s appreciation
for law’s complexity. XJur does not take psychology (or legal history or economics or moral philosophy) as the discipline with
primacy. And it does not take experimentation (or cost-benefit
analysis or moral theory) as the only essentially valid tool.
A second central theme of the New Private Law is that it
“takes private law concepts and categories seriously.”271 It works
to appreciate the nuanced “conceptual structure of the law,”272
rejecting the realist critique that law’s central concepts are “fictions, nonsense.”273 This conceptualism also takes seriously people’s ordinary concepts. Central figures in the New Private Law
even suggest that legal concepts generally should reflect features of ordinary concepts. As Professors Andrew Gold and Henry Smith put it: “The set of legal concepts benefits from its congruence with relatively simple local forms of conventional
morality. . . . Certainly, contract law can diverge from the morality
of promising, just as legislation can go beyond corrective justice.
Nevertheless, the ability to draw on simple local morality is an
important starting point.”274
Experimental jurisprudence agrees. Descriptively, many legal concepts share features of the ordinary concept.275 This supports the “folk-law thesis.”276 It would be bizarre for law’s concepts

268 John C.P. Goldberg, Introduction: Pragmatism and Private Law, 125 HARV. L.
REV. 1640, 1650 (2012).
269 See generally, e.g., Ben-Shahar & Strahilevitz, supra note 72 (proposing experiments to solve problems of contract interpretation).
270 See supra Part III.
271 Andrew Gold, Introduction, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE NEW PRIVATE
LAW, supra note 6, at xvi.
272 Goldberg, supra note 268, at 1652.
273 Id.
274 Andrew S. Gold & Henry E. Smith, Sizing Up Private Law, 70 U. TORONTO L.J.
489, 504–05 (2020).
275 See generally Tobia, supra note 91.
276 See supra note 91 and accompanying text.

2022]

Experimental Jurisprudence

793

of good faith, reasonableness, cause, duty, or wrong to be entirely untethered from corresponding ordinary concepts. Some theorists working in experimental jurisprudence also endorse Gold
and Smith’s normative suggestion that legal concepts benefit
from reflecting features of the corresponding ordinary one. Thus,
the fact that an ordinary concept has a feature provides a (defeasible) reason that the corresponding legal concept should
share that feature.277
So, there is common ground between experimental jurisprudence and the New Private Law. Experimental jurisprudence
can contribute to the New Private Law a richer set of data and
questions for jurisprudential debate. As Part II’s experimental
studies reveal, ordinary concepts and moral reasoning are not
always “simple,”278 intuitive, or obvious. What the seminar room
agrees is “ordinarily wrongful” may not reflect what, in fact, all
ordinary people understand to be wrongful.
XJur shares the New Private Law’s general commitment to
understanding ordinary and legal concepts and the belief that
such study is truly complex. For example, in assessing the relationship between contract and promise, there is still much to
learn about both (legal) contract and (ordinary) promise. Experimental methods have uncovered important insights about lay
intuitions of contract279 and ordinary promising—many of which
are not simple or obvious from the armchair.280
Here again, the New Private Law might be skeptical of empirical approaches to legal scholarship, which are often reductive, inspired by legal realism, and focused on predicting how
judges really decide cases—how things really work when “getting down to brass tacks.”281 Some empirical and psychological
studies support criticism of traditional assumptions of reductive
and instrumental approaches. For example, legal psychology can
illuminate behavioral realities that conflict with standard assumptions of law and economics models.282
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See, e.g., supra Part II.
Gold & Smith, supra note 274, at 505.
279 See generally, e.g., Hoffman & Wilkinson-Ryan, supra note 75.
280 See generally, e.g., Vanberg, supra note 76; Mischkowski et al., supra note 76;
Moral Intuitions, supra note 76; Promises, Reliance, and Psychological Lock-In, supra
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281 Goldberg, supra note 268, at 1642. For an example of empiricism and realism,
see generally Miles & Sunstein, supra note 186.
282 For a helpful example, see Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Psychology and the New Private
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Modern experimental jurisprudence takes a different approach, moving away from the “New Realism,”283 the old experimental jurisprudence (e.g., testing law’s effects),284 and the psychological literature on heuristics and biases. XJur does not
primarily study laypeople as potential jurors with choices to
model, biases to correct, and decisions to nudge. Instead—like
the New Private Law—XJur sees the study of ordinary concepts
as central to legal theory. As the New Private Law puts it, laypeople are not merely jurors, but also “norm articulators . . . often
charged with interpreting . . . [what] counts as ‘reasonable.’”285
This observation also supports a reply to Professor Jimenez’s
suggestion286 to only count the intuitions of those who contribute
to law’s content: Ordinary people sometimes contribute to law’s
content. XJur and the New Private Law both (correctly) understand laypeople not as mere legal objects but as central
members of our legal community, poised to contribute meaningfully to law and legal theory.287
Experimental jurisprudence and the New Private Law agree
“that there is often at least a family resemblance between legal
and extralegal concepts and norms that bear on questions of
personal interaction”288 and that the nature of that resemblance
is worth exploring. Both tend to reject reductive instrumentalism; they agree that legal concepts should not always reflect ordinary ones. Instead, legal theory should grapple with the complex nature of its concepts, and that grappling process should
typically include study of the corresponding and constituent ordinary concepts.
Again, neither the New Private Law nor XJur will simply
take the ordinary concepts as constitutive of legal ones. Yet both
programs recognize the process of studying ordinary concepts as
an essential part of jurisprudence. Consider Professors Goldberg
and Benjamin Zipursky’s description of their task in Recognizing
Wrongs:
We come to the job of explaining the common law somewhat
like one trying to explain how the members of a community
use their language. The goal is to make explicit the various
283
284
285
286
287
288

Id.
See generally Beutel, supra note 1.
Goldberg, supra note 268, at 1657.
See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
See id. at 1656.
Id.
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patterns of thought and conduct that animate this area of
the law. If it turns out that many of the concepts and principles utilized in this area have the same character as, or a
character very similar to, those which are utilized in nonlegal discourse about how one ought (morally) to conduct
oneself—indeed, if it turns out that some of the concepts are
identical—that is something to be acknowledged, not hidden
from view.289
This question—how do the concepts in law compare to the
concepts in nonlaw—is essential to the New Private Law. Answering that question requires deep knowledge of law and
nonlaw. Of course, we all have some knowledge of ordinary concepts such as reasonableness, causation, consent, intent, duty,
and wrongfulness. But even those ordinary notions are complex,
calling for study from more than one method. Introspection,
thought experimentation, and moral theorizing can provide tremendous insight into those ordinary concepts. So too can empirical methods. And as Part II demonstrates, some empirical insights are unique—inaccessible via individual introspection or
thought experimentation.
XJur appears complementary to the New Private Law in
part because the New Private Law is admirably honest about
the project’s commitments, the complexity of law, and the multifaceted inquiry that jurisprudence calls for. Consider again
Goldberg and Zipursky:
Publicity, notice, generality, prospectivity, and the other
values that Fuller emphasized seem lacking in a system
that relies on judges to articulate rules and principles on a
case-by-case basis instead of stating them in canonical form
in a code or statute book. . . . There is another way in which
tort law achieves a kind of fairness in operation by means
apart from Fullerian methods. . . . Part of what it means for
tort law to be ‘“common law” . . . is that the wrongs recognized by tort law are, in their substance, drawn from everyday life rather than constructed de novo by judges in aid of
some sort of social engineering project.290

289
290

JOHN C.P. GOLDBERG & BENJAMIN C. ZIPURSKY, RECOGNIZING WRONGS 79 (2020).
Id. at 207–08.
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XJur is well-positioned to contribute to debates about publicity, notice, and rule-of-law values.291 But there is one further
(and much more general) justification of XJur and its focus on
laypeople—one that Goldberg and Zipursky suggest above: experimental jurisprudence is actually called for by one of the
most general and longstanding projects within jurisprudence.
One implication of this more general justification is that the
experimental-jurisprudence approach is not limited to only
those jurisprudential debates premised on publicity or democracy or to situations where there is also a relevant jury instruction
referring explicitly to reasonableness or consent.
That longstanding project is the determination of our appropriate legal criteria. For example, what are law’s criteria of wrongs,
causation, reasonableness, and intent? Countless traditionaljurisprudential projects address this type of question, and most
often they address it as the New Private Law does, by considering everyday life. The foundation of jurisprudence is not “Judge
Hercules,” but the ordinary person:
Holmes’s . . . understandable disdain for the pedantic moralist unfortunately led him to pose a false dilemma between
the pedant and the bad man. Missing from his analysis is
the ordinary person, the lawyer who counsels this person,
and the judge who understands, applies, and crafts the law
imagining that her legal community expects her to take this
perspective seriously.292
Experimental jurisprudence provides unique insight into
exactly this question: How does the ordinary person understand
what is consensual, causal, reasonable, or intentional?
Although this Section has focused on the New Private Law,
XJur’s usefulness extends more broadly, to a range of debates in
public- and private-law theory. Most legal theorists—not just
those in the New Private Law—recognize the crucial connection
between law and ordinary people.
291
292

See supra Part IV.A.
GOLDBERG & ZIPURSKY, supra note 289, at 109; see also id. at 364:

It is not only judges and lawyers who interact with the law of torts, directly or
indirectly. Everyone does. We all need to know what to expect of the persons,
businesses, offices, and organizations around us, and we all need to know what
is expected of us. That is why the wrongs recognized by courts as torts cannot
be the wrongs that Judge Hercules would endorse for being those whose recognition would make the law the best it can be from the perspective of aspirational political or moral theory.
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As one more example, consider a seminal article in traditional jurisprudence: Professor Gregory Keating’s Reasonableness and Rationality in Negligence Theory. Keating argues that
tort negligence is—and should be—grounded in reasonable (not
rational) risk imposition. Moreover, Keating argues, tort reasonableness is better explained by social-contract theory than by
law and economics.293
Perhaps surprisingly, that nonempirical work of jurisprudence begins with a reflection about our ordinary cognition:
“Latent in our ordinary moral consciousness, and manifest in
philosophical reflection, is a distinction between reasonableness
and rationality.”294 This appeal to ordinary cognition is not merely rhetorical or motivational. Throughout the article, Keating
emphasizes the central role that ordinary concepts play in the
jurisprudential argument: “[B]ecause negligence law assigns
paramount importance to the concept of reasonableness, it receives stronger support from social contract theory than from
economics.”295
Not all of Keating’s arguments depend on empirical facts
about the ordinary concept of reasonableness, but this first one
reflects an important and often overlooked mode of jurisprudence. For legally significant concepts that have an ordinary
counterpart, a central question is: What is that ordinary concept? This is a jurisprudential question.
Of course, the legal criteria are not necessarily equivalent to
the criteria of the ordinary concept, but traditional jurisprudence understands that there is something critically important
in grappling with the features of the corresponding ordinary
concept. For example, Keating argues that the ordinary notion
of reasonableness supports social-contract theory: “Social contract theory holds that persons must be held ‘responsible for
their ends.’ They must, that is, moderate the demands that they
make on social institutions so that those demands fit within the
constraints of mutually acceptable principles. This is simply an
extension of our ordinary idea of reasonableness.”296

293
294
295
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Keating, supra note 28, at 212–13.
Id. at 311.
Id. at 382.
Id. at 370; see also id.:

Reasonable people do not have an extravagant sense of the importance of their
own preferences and aspirations in comparison with the aspirations of others.
Moreover, reasonable people do not believe that their projects warrant the
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This argument for the social-contract theory of reasonableness depends upon an empirical claim about the ordinary concept. As it happens, recent experimental-jurisprudence research
provides some support for Keating’s view. Empirical studies confirm that there is an important distinction between the ordinary
notions of reasonableness and rationality, which supports Keating’s hypotheses.297 Moreover, as Keating intuited, the ordinary
concept of reasonableness reflects what is socially acceptable,298
not necessarily what is economically rational or efficient.299
In this example, Keating’s intuitions about the ordinary
concept of reasonableness were impressively accurate. Later
experimental-jurisprudence studies lend further support to
Keating’s (empirical) jurisprudential hypotheses. But it is possible that intuitive, armchair jurisprudence might not capture the
whole picture of ordinary cognition in some other cases.
This possible disconnect—between what a legal expert believes about the ordinary concept and what is true of the ordinary concept—could arise for many reasons. One possibility is
that the legal expert just makes a mistake. The expert’s intuition about the ordinary concept does not actually reflect the features of the ordinary concept. Perhaps the author did not think
sufficiently clearly or employed an unconscious bias in favor of
some particular theory. Studying the ordinary concept more robustly—with empirical methods—might help strengthen the
theorist’s conclusions. As Macleod puts it, “Hart and Honoré, after all, had a sample size of two: Hart and Honoré.”300 Experimental jurisprudence can serve as an empirically grounded
method of jurisprudential conceptual analysis.
It could also be that a legal expert, by virtue of all of their
expertise and training, has some diminished access to the ordinary concept. When law students encounter a new concept of
causation, are their corresponding ordinary concepts entirely
unchanged? Or has their concept of causation changed both in
and out of law? This is an open and unexplored empirical question. But if legal or philosophical education might sometimes alter

commitment of a disproportionate share of social wealth, and they do not make
demands on others that they would be unwilling to honor themselves.
297

See generally Grossman et al., supra note 79.
Keating, supra note 28, at 383.
299 See generally Jaeger, supra note 79 (finding that the legal notion of reasonableness is affected more by what is customary than by what is economically rational).
300 Macleod, supra note 115, at 1021.
298
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one’s ordinary concepts, this is another major reason that experimental jurisprudence would play a critical role in linking legal
and ordinary concepts.
This process could also interact with the constitution of jurisprudence as a field. If most legal theorists intuit X, students
who intuit not X might (mistakenly) think that they simply don’t
understand legal theory. As those students eschew legal theory,
this preserves the apparent universality of intuition X within
legal-theory circles. In the words of Professor Robert Cummins:
“Those who do not share the intuitions are simply not invited to
the games.”301
Moreover, there are features of a legal concept that laypeople cannot access, but perhaps there also features of the ordinary concept that legal experts cannot perfectly access. Given
the classical jurisprudential project of comparing ordinary to legal concepts,302 this possibility could support a jurisprudential
division of conceptual labor; with laypeople as the experts of ordinary concepts and cognition.
A final possibility is that some features of ordinary concepts
are not easily accessible by introspection—by anyone, layperson
or expert. For example, consider the “hybrid theory” of reasonableness. On that view, reasonableness judgments reflect a hybrid of statistical and prescriptive considerations. It may not be
possible to cleanly test such a subtle feature of the concept with
the traditional mode of armchair thought experimentation. No
matter how hard one reflects, it might be difficult to identify
with certainty whether one’s own notion of what is reasonable is
a hybrid of considerations of the average and ideal. However, it
is possible to begin to assess the predictions of that proposed
analysis with cognitive science.303
A central part of experimental jurisprudence is the study of
ordinary language and concepts. And this is precisely because a
central part of jurisprudence is such study of ordinary language
and concepts. Jurisprudence has long been concerned with “our

301

Cummins, supra note 29, at 116.
See generally, e.g., Honoré & Gardner, supra note 219.
303 In one study, a large number of participants were assigned to separate groups to
evaluate average, ideal, and reasonable quantities, and then the mean ratings were statistically analyzed to assess whether average and ideal ratings both predict reasonableness ratings. See generally Tobia, supra note 79. This provides some evidence in favor of
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moral intuitions,”304 the “intuitions of a community”305—not the
seminar-room community but rather our social and legal community. As Professor Jeremy Waldron explains, “It is not
enough that we have considered what Kant said to Fichte.”306 Intuitions of legal philosophers are to be assessed against what is
in fact, “out there, in the world.”307
CONCLUSION
“Whither jurisprudence? Time will tell.”308 Some offer
skeptical and pessimistic prognoses, heralding the “death of
jurisprudence.” 309
These reports are greatly exaggerated. Judge Richard Posner described jurisprudence as “the most fundamental, general,
and theoretical plane of analysis of the social phenomenon
called law.”310 Scholars will (and should) continue to inquire into longstanding, fundamental, general, and theoretical legal
questions.
So why the pessimism? One jurisprudential eulogy concerns
the field’s dissolution into other disciplines.311 Perhaps there is
nothing distinctively legal about law’s notions of causation,
knowledge, and reasonableness. The questions of traditional jurisprudence are scattered into questions of law-as-morality312 or
law-as-economics. Experimental jurisprudence might be seen as
another destructively instrumental force, proposing law-assurveys-of-laypeople.
However, this misunderstands the XJur movement. Rather than imagining jurisprudential questions dissolving into
304

E.g., Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Justifying Self-Defense, 24 LAW & PHIL. 711, 749
(2005) (explaining the role of intuition in the proposed analysis of self-defense).
305 Joshua Dressler, Does One Mens Rea Fit All?: Thoughts on Alexander’s Unified
Conception of Criminal Culpability, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 955, 961 (2000).
306 Jeremy Waldron, How to Argue for a Universal Claim, 30 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 305, 313 (1999). Waldron’s point concerns the comparison of our (Western) humanrights intuitions against the intuitions of those from other (non-Western) countries. The
point relevant to this Article is that it is also assumed that the relevant intuitions are
not just those of expert legal theorists—what matters are the views of “people or whole
societies.” Id. at 306.
307 Id. at 313 (emphasis omitted).
308 Solum, supra note 1, at 2497.
309 See, e.g., Omri Ben-Zvi, Zombie Jurisprudence, in SEARCHING FOR CONTEMPORARY
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nonjurisprudential questions of moral philosophy or social science, experimental jurisprudence reaffirms these questions’
fundamentally jurisprudential nature.
Questions about whether and how legal concepts differ from
ordinary ones are both longstanding jurisprudential questions
and partly empirical ones. Central legal concepts may share features with their ordinary counterparts. It is possible that not all
features of ordinary concepts are known and that not all features are discoverable by introspection or armchair thought experimentation. Empirical methods contribute unique data about
ordinary language and concepts that speak to these central
questions of jurisprudence. The XJur program does not assume
that law should simply adopt the ordinary concept, but understanding the ordinary features—whether by thought experimentation or modern experimentation—raises important questions
and is a central part of the analysis of legal concepts. Experimental jurisprudence thereby reopens a range of fascinating jurisprudential questions about law and its concepts.313 Moreover,
it provides new tools to address these questions. Experiments
have revealed new, subtle, and surprising conceptual features,
all of which call for further theoretical analysis.
While experimental jurisprudence offers new methods, it also invites analysis from those who do not themselves conduct
empirical studies. This is one lesson of the debunked myths: to
participate, one need not run experiments or even collect original data. Empirical data is a prerequisite, but there is already
an abundance of data ripe for experimental-jurisprudential
analysis. The cognitive science of ordinary language and concepts is full of such data.314 Those data are “suspended experimental jurisprudence,” just waiting to be incorporated into experimental jurisprudence with the addition of thoughtful
theoretical analysis. For jurisprudence theorists concerned with
our intuitions, empirical work in cognitive science is an essential
resource.
This Article has argued that experimental jurisprudence is
not a social-scientific replacement of jurisprudence. Rather, it is
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Perhaps legal concepts share many features of the corresponding ordinary ones,
or perhaps they are very distinctive. The truth, I would bet, is that legal concepts most
often reflect a mixture of features—some drawn from corresponding ordinary concepts
and others that are unique. But that remains an open empirical question. And the place
to start is with experimental discoveries of the features of these concepts.
314 See supra notes 53–133 and accompanying text.
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a form of jurisprudence. Traditional jurisprudence has always
contained a central empirical program concerned with law’s relation to ordinary people, language, and concepts. Justifications
for that traditional project also justify the experimental approach. It is the opposing view—that jurisprudence has nothing
to learn from careful study of ordinary language and concepts—
that reflects a dramatic break from tradition.
Whither experimental jurisprudence? To the same place as
jurisprudence: in search of increasingly sophisticated answers to
our fundamental legal questions.

